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INTRODUCTION

The authors of several papers in this Symposium have justifiably
criticized the essay that former Vice President Dan Quayle published in Volume 41 of The American University Law Review.' Many
knowledgeable observers of the civil justice system have leveled
equally legitimate criticism at civil justice reform initiatives that the
Bush administration instituted. 2 Questionable data, arguable policy, or overheated political rhetoric supported certain aspects of the
Vice President's paper, as well as most of the proposals developed
by the Competitiveness Council that the Vice President chaired5 and
numerous efforts of the Republican administration in the area of
4
civil justice reform.
One endeavor, involving executive branch civil justice reform in
the field of federal civil procedure, apparently was less problematic.
That effort, which aimed to "facilitate the just and efficient resolution of civil claims" involving the United States Government, imposed a number of requirements on government attorneys who
participate in civil litigation. 5 This is a Bush administration initiative that Vice President Quayle mentioned in his essay and that the
1. See Dan Quayle, CivilJustice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 559-69 (1992) (proposing
civil justice reform, including specific proposals in areas such as voluntary dispute resolution;
discovery, punitive damages, expert witnesses, and attorney's fees).
2. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 275, 277-87 (1992) (asserting that former Vice President Quayle's suggestion that there
are too many lawyers and his analogizing litigation to cancerous growth are shallow and without substantive analysis). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin Procedural
Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 384-408 (1992) (suggesting that Civil Justice Reform Act will
transform civil procedure into arcane science);Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence Is Sound: It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631-36 (1991) (arguing that
proposed amendments to expert testimony rules would exclude probative evidence).
3. See Dan Quayle, Proposed CivilJustice Reform Legislation: Proposed Legislation: Agenda for
CivilJustice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1992) [hereinafter Quayle, Proposed Legislation] (describing composition of Federal Civil Justice Reform working group,
under authority of Council on Competitiveness, in memorandum to President Bush outlining
Council's recommendations).
4. See Carl Tobias, The Clinton Administration and CivilJusticeReform, 144 F.R.D. 437,44345 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Clinton Administration] (describing Bush administration's efforts
to implement civil justice reform).
5. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 359-60 (1991), reprintedin 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that purpose of order is to facilitate just and efficient resolution of civil claims involving U.S. Government, to encourage filing of only meritorious civil
claims, to improve legislative and regulatory drafting, to reduce needless litigation, to promote fair and prompt adjudication before administrative tribunals, and to provide model for
similar reforms of litigation practices in private sector and states).
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6
Clinton administration must rigorously analyze.
The Bush administration briefly experimented with civil justice
reform in the executive branch. President Bush promulgated Executive Order 12,778 on October 23, 1991, and the order became effective in January 1992. 7 That same month, the United States
Department of Justice issued preliminary guidance that was intended to assist federal agencies and government lawyers in effectuating the Executive order." Nonetheless, the Department only
finalized those guidelines in the waning days of the Bush administration.9 Although the Republican administration did not fully implement executive branch civil justice reform, the Executive order and
the accompanying guidance seemed well considered and prescribed
some procedures that apparently would be efficacious in reducing
expense and delay, the ostensible purpose of civil justice reform.10
Moreover, the order and the guidelines will be in effect until President Clinton modifies them,"1 so that his administration must decide how to treat this nascent reform.
The factors above mean that civil justice reform in the executive

6. See Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 1, at 560 (noting that Executive Order
12,778 is preliminary step in process of reforming dispute resolution methodology); see also
Tobias, Clinton Administration,supra note 4, at 441-45 (describing procedural reforms inherited
by Clinton administration and explaining need for close analysis of initiatives).
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 359, 367 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that order is effective 90 days after signing).
8. See Memorandum of Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Reforms of Executive Order No. 12,778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640 (1992) [hereinafter Preliminary
Memorandum].
9. See Memorandum of Guidance on Implementation of the Reforms of Executive Order No. 12,778, 58 Fed. Reg. 6015 (1993) [hereinafter Memorandum]. This memorandum
was not issued by the Department ofJustice untilJanuary 25, 1993, five days after the inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton as the forty-second President of the United States. Id. at
6015; see Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Takes Oath as 42nd President, Urging Sacrifice To "Renew
America, " N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A5 (describing inauguration of President Clinton).
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 359-60, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(listing reduction of expense and delay of litigation, among other considerations, as purpose
of civil justice reform); Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6016 (noting that Memorandum "provides guidance for applying Order's provisions" with eye toward order's explicit purpose of
'facilitat[ing] the just and efficient resolution of civil claims involving the United States' ").
11. See Tobias, Clinton Administration, supra note 4, at 437-38 (noting that President Clinton has opportunity to address numerous issues concerning federal courts and suggesting
that he carefully analyze executive branch civil justice reform begun by Bush administration).
President Clinton's power to modify the order, as stated in the order itself, derives from "the
authority vested in ...[the] President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including chapter 31 of title 28, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3,
United States Code." Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 360, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-530 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (describing Department ofJustice
as executive department and describing nature and responsibilities of Attorney General); 3
U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (authorizing presidential power to delegate authority to
agency officials). See generally Cass Sunstein, Cost Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23
ARiz. L. REv. 1267, 1268-69 (1981) (describing increasing use of Executive orders to regulate
agency actions).
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branch warrants systematic assessment to ascertain whether the
Clinton administration should continue experimenting with the concept and, if so, how the administration can most effectively implement the reform. This Article undertakes that effort. The Article
first traces the origins and development of civil justice reform in the

area of federal civil procedure, emphasizing the Bush administration's attempts to institute executive branch reform. The Article
then critically evaluates the Bush administration initiative and finds
it sufficiently promising to warrant additional effectuation and ongoing experimentation, particularly if the endeavor is vigorously implemented, rigorously evaluated, and recalibrated. The third Part

of this Article affords numerous suggestions that the Clinton administration should follow to effectuate, and to continue experimenting
with, civil justice reform in the executive branch.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
A. CivilJustice Reform Under the CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990
1. The 1990 statute
The statutory background of civil justice reform in the field of federal civil procedure requires only brief treatment here because
others have thoroughly examined the topic.

12

Congress enacted the

Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA or Act) 13 in 1990 out of concern
about growing abuse in civil litigation, especially during the discovery process, and in response to the increasing expense entailed in
resolving civil cases and shrinking access to federal courts for
resolving civil lawsuits. 14 Since the mid-1970s, numerous federal
judges had been asserting that a litigation explosion was taking
place in the federal courts, resulting in increased discovery and litigation abuse.15
12. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 2, at 384-406 (analyzing civil justice reform of 1980s
and arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is noble but ill-advised piece of legislation
that will only complicate civil procedure);JeffreyJ. Peck, "Users United": The CivilJusticeReform
Act of 1990, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 105, 105-09 (addressing background
and substantive components of Civil Justice Reform Act); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507, 507-09 (1992) (charting recent developments in civil justice reform
efforts among legislative, judicial, and executive branches of Federal Government).
13. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, §§ 101-650, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992).
14. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990, S. REP.
No. 101-416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6804-05
(stating that legislation is response to increasing cost of civil litigation and problems created
by lack of adequate judicial resources); see also Peck, supra note 12, at 105-06 (discussing attitudes of litigators and federal trial judges concerning nature and extent of litigation costs and
delays).
15. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976) (upholding district court's dismissal of antitrust action due to party's failure to obey
discovery order and noting that extreme sanction of dismissal is appropriate where party
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The GJRA requires that each of the federal trial courts develop a

civil justice expense and delay reduction plan by December 1993.16

The purposes of the plans are "to facilitate deliberate adjudication
of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation
management, and ensure just, speedy and inexpensive resolutions
of civil disputes."' 17 Under the CJRA, every federal district court
must adopt a plan once it has examined a report compiled by an
advisory group for the district.18
The advisory groups, which the courts named within ninety days
of the statute's enactment, were to be "balanced," including attorneys and individuals who are representative of litigants involved in
the districts' civil cases. 19 The Act mandates that the groups comprehensively analyze the courts' civil and criminal dockets and identify the major sources of expense and delay, as well as trends
involving case filings and demands placed on the districts' resources. 20 In formulating recommendations, the groups must consider the needs and circumstances of the courts, litigants, and
litigants' lawyers and must ensure that all three contribute significantly to decreasing expense and delay, thus facilitating access to
the civil justice system. 21 After districts receive the advisory groups'
reports and recommendations, the courts are to review them and
confer with the groups. 22 The districts then must consider, and may
adopt, the eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques listed in the
legislation and any other procedures deemed appropriate for reducing expense or delay.23
shows flagrant bad faith and callous disregard of responsibilities); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975) (noting that discovery provisions of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are liberal with potential for abuse); Dissent from Order Amending the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (dissenting from adoption of amendments because amendments do not go far enough to rectify intolerable abuse of discovery process where party with greater resources prevails through threat
of delay and expense, thereby denying justice to poorer opponents); see also RICHARD A. PosNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 1-130 (1985) (describing federal courts as in
state of crisis due to explosion in caseload, lack of judicial resources, and need for more
coherent, practicable judicial philosophy).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992).
17. Id.
18. Id.§ 472.
19. Id.§ 478(b).

20. Id.§ 472(c)(1).
21. Id.§ 472(c)(2)-(3).
22. Id.§ 472(a).
23. See id. § 473(a)-(b). The legislation proposes the following specific principles and
guidelines: (1)systematic, differential treatment of civil
cases tailored to accommodate each
specific case's complexity and length of time; (2) early and ongoing control of pretrial process
by judicial officer; (3)careful, deliberate monitoring of discovery by judicial officer through a

discovery management conference where complexity of case so demands; (4) encouragement
of cost-effective exchange of information through cooperative discovery devices; (5) requiring
that alldiscovery motions be accompanied by certification of moving party that a reasonable
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2. Early implementation
Thirty-five groups presented reports and suggestions to their
courts before December 31, 1991, and thirty-four districts issued
plans by that date to qualify for the status of Early Implementation
District Courts (EIDCs). 24 The Committee on Court Administration
and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United
States officially designated the thirty-four courts as EIDCs on July
30, 1992.25 The remaining advisory groups and courts are proceeding with civil justice planning, although only two districts promulgated civil justice plans in 1992,26 and a small number of courts will
probably adopt plans before the deadline of December 1993.27
Thoroughgoing assessment of the civil justice expense and delay
reduction plans that the EIDCs developed is relatively unimportant
to understanding the most significant issues that executive branch
reform implicates. Nonetheless, the assessment below affords a
general examination and specific examples of those aspects of early
civil justice planning under the 1990 legislation that are most pertinent to civil justice reform efforts in the executive branch.
Nearly all EIDCs, relying on the reports and recommendations of
their advisory groups, apparently engaged in the kind of introspection and prescribed the types of procedures that Congress envieffort has been made to reach agreement with the opposing party; (6) use of alternative dispute resolution where appropriate; (7) requiring each party to submit a discovery management plan at the initial pretrial conference; (8) requiring that at each pretrial conference each
party be represented by an attorney who has the authority to bind the party regarding all
matters previously identified by the court; (9) requiring that all requests for extension of discovery deadline or postponement of trial be signed by both attorney and party making the
request; (10) setting up a neutral, nonbinding evaluation program where a neutral court officer considers the legal and factual basis of the case; and (11) requiring that, upon court
notice, an attorney with the power to bind each party be present or available by telephone
during any settlement conference. Id.
24. See Carl TobiasJudicialOversight of CivilJustice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56 (1992) [hereinafter TobiasJudidalOversight] (listing 34 Early Implementation District Courts (EIDCs)).
25. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Gene E. Brooks, Chief'Judge, U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 1 (July 30, 1992) (on file with The American
University Law Review) (approving Southern District of Indiana as EIDC and recognizing that
each district has own peculiar problems); Letter from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Paul G.
Hatfield, Chief'Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Montana 1 (July 30, 1992) (on file
with The American University Law Review) (approving District of Montana as EIDC).

26. U.S.

DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF Mo., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY

RE-

DUCTION PLAN (Apr. 30, 1992) [hereinafter WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI PLAN]; U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF TEX., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov.
30, 1992).
27. A number of advisory groups issued reports in 1992. These include advisory group
reports from the Southern District of Iowa, the Eastern District of Louisiana, the District of
New Mexico, the Middle District of North Carolina, the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the
District of South Dakota, the Eastern District of Tennessee, the Northern District of Texas,
the Western District of Texas, and the Western District of Washington.
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sioned. 28 The courts apparently attended to the legislative
objectives of decreasing expense and delay in civil lawsuits, carefully
evaluated their civil and criminal dockets, and considered and
adopted the eleven statutorily prescribed principles, guidelines, and
techniques for facilitating litigation. 29
A number of procedures with which the EIDCs are experimenting
closely resemble those that are significant components of executive
branch civil justice reform. Practically all of the districts have employed measures that are intended to encourage settlement. 30 An
important means by which courts promote settlement is through the
use of various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).31 A
few courts even impose onerous requirements covering participation in ADR.3 2 For instance, the Western District of Missouri ran-

domly and automatically assigns one-third of its civil cases to an
28. See, e.g., U.S.
LAY REDUCTION PLAN

DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF CAL., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DEEASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PLAN]

1-2 (Dec. 3, 1991) [hereinafter

(stating that plan was result of diligent efforts of advisory group to identify instances in which
civil case management could be enhanced); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF GA., CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 26-54 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA PLAN] (reviewing local rules of practice as amended pursuant to CJRA);
U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 1 (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PLAN] (noting that court is "presented with the challenge of

bringing costs under control so that our society may enjoy the benefits of a civil justice system
that is affordable, timely, and fair").
29. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF IND., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN

1-2 (Dec. 30, 1991)

[hereinafter SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA PLAN] (stat-

ing that court, pursuant to its obligations as early implementation district, has considered
recommendations of its advisory committee); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN

2 (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETrS

PLAN] (noting that advisory group has made detailed, thorough, ongoing assessment of
court's civil and criminal docket pursuant to CJRA); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF
MICH., DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN 1-9 (finding that while court is generally
meeting its responsibility to litigants to provide " 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every [civil] action'" as required by CJRA, 17 specific proposals require implementation to further this goal).
30. See, e.g., EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PLAN, supra note 28, at 7 (requiring all
judges to offer to conduct early settlement conferences); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

PLAN, supra note 28, at 7 (requiring two mandatory settlement conferences and continued
judicial involvement); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF W. VA., PLAN FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION 79-80 (Dec. 18, 1991) (requiring mandatory pretrial confer-

ences in complex cases to develop case management plans and encourage settlement).
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

3-9 (Aug. 1992)

[hereinafter

ADR GUIDANCE]

(describing alternative dispute resolution techniques and procedures, including arbitration,
mediation, early neutral evaluation, factfinding, and minitrials).
32. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 15-18 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PLAN] (requiring that all claims for $100,000 or less be sent to arbitration); EASTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 28, at 5-9 (noting that judicial officer may refer cases to various
ADR programs where appropriate); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF UTAH, CIVILJUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9-10 (Dec. 30, 1991) (noting that resort to litigation
process is last resort and that court will experiment with court-supervised mediation, arbitration, minitrials, and summary jury trials).
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ADR program and subjects to sanctions litigants who do not partici33
pate in good faith.
Sanctions are another procedure included in the plans of numerous EIDCs that are an important feature of civil justice reform in the
executive branch.3 4 A number of EIDCs authorize judges to impose
sanctions on litigants and lawyers for failing to comply with various
provisions in their civil justice plans.3 5 Indeed, the Massachusetts
Plan provides that negligent violations are punishable with sanc36
tions.

Discovery is an additional, significant area in which many EIDCs
have adopted procedures that resemble those central to executive
branch reform. For example, a majority of the EIDCs have prescribed some form of mandatory prediscovery disclosure that is premised on a controversial 1991 proposal to revise the Federal Rules,
which has now been superseded. 37 A number of EIDCs have also
33. See WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI PLAN, supra note 26, at 1; cf U.S. DIST. COURT
FOR THE S. DIST. OF W. VA., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 81-84 (Dec.
30, 1991) [hereinafter SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA PLAN] (describing scope of
mandatory mediation program as potentially including all civil cases within district, with final
determination made by court). The West Virginia plan refers to ten categories of cases as
typical for inclusion in the mediation program: commercial and other contract cases, personal
injury matters, civil rights employment cases, ERISA cases, tax matters, debt collection cases,
asbestos claims, FELA matters, labor management employment cases, and miscellaneous civil
actions. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA PLAN, supra, at 81-84. The plan specifically
excludes from mediation cases involving administrative agency appeals, habeas corpus and
other prisoner petitions, forfeitures of seized property, and bankruptcy appeals. Id.
34. Cf Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(f), 3 C.F.R. 359, 362 (1991), reprintedin 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. 11 1991) (stating that litigation counsel shall take steps to seek sanctions against
opposing parties where appropriate).
35. See SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA PLAN, supra note 29, at 9 (noting that counsel has
responsibility to prepare case management agenda and present agenda to court at pretrial
conference or face possible imposition of sanctions); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE V.I. REPORT
AND PLAN OF THE ADVISORY GROUP 35 (Dec. 23, 1991) (stating that any breach or failure to
perform under agreement reached at pretrial conference is basis for imposition of sanctions,
including costs, attorney fees, entry of judgment or agreement, or other appropriate
remedies).
36. See DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLAN, supra note 29, at 67 (observing that district
court has broad discretion to impose sanctions).
37. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. AND BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, THE CIVILJUSTiCE REFORM ACT OF 1990 EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10-11 (Dec. 19, 1991) [hereinafter DISTRICT OF IDAHO PLAN] (requiring parties, within 30 days of service of complaint, to
make initial disclosure, including list of persons with relevant knowledge, list of witnesses,
copy or description of all relevant records, and existence of any relevant insurance agreement). After initial disclosure, the parties must also disclose the substance of any expert testimony and adhere to limits on document production requests, interrogatories, and
depositions. Id.; see also COMMrrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF ThE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 16, 26, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 83-84, 8788 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL] (proposing discovery requirements,

including disclosure of persons with relevant knowledge, witnesses, relevant documents, insurance agreements, and expert testimony); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA PLAN, supra note
28, at 14 (noting that court may develop mandatory interrogatories to be answered by each
party); EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PLAN, supra note 32, at 4-5 (listing discovery limita-
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required parties to certify that they have attempted to resolve discovery disputes with their opponents before submitting discovery
38
motions to the courts.
B.
1.

Executive Branch CivilJustice Reform Under the Bush Administration
Executive branch experimentation
a. Executive order and Department ofJustice guidance
i. Background

On October 23, 1991, President George Bush issued Executive
Order 12,778, which was intended to facilitate the efficient and fair
resolution of civil disputes in which the United States Government
is involved. 39 On January 30, 1992, the Department of Justice published a memorandum that provided preliminary guidance to federal administrative agencies and government attorneys on the
order's prescriptions. 40 The major dimensions of the order modify
the ways that government counsel "conduct discovery, seek sanc41
tions, present witnesses at trial, and attempt to settle cases."
The Department of Justice requested that federal agencies and
government attorneys submit comments recounting their experiences with the order by July 20, 1992, and announced that it intended to review the information tendered, rely on that material in
tions and other pretrial requirements, including initial disclosure and limits on interrogatories
and depositions). The Civil Rules Committee dramatically reversed course twice in two
months on this issue. See Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4,
1992, at 1, 12 (reporting that Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, after reversing course
twice, proposed reform of discovery process in order to keep pace with legislative and executive branch civil litigation reform and thus preserve independence ofjudiciary). In September
1992, the Judicial Conference sent a proposal for mandatory prediscovery disclosure to the
Supreme Court. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 26 (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS]. On April 22, 1993, the Court transmitted that proposal to Congress. See 61
U.S.L.W. 4365, 4372-76 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (suggesting that amendments to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure be adopted and take effect on December 1, 1993).
38. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF PA., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN 15 (Dec. 31, 1991) (stating that no motion shall be entered without certification by counsel that reasonable effort to resolve dispute has been made); U.S. DIST. COURT
FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL., CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 14 (Dec. 27,
1991) (requiring statement that good faith effort to resolve dispute was made at discovery
conference and requiring statement to recite date, time, and all persons participating in conference); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF WYO., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 13 (Dec. 1991) (stating that parties must make reasonable, good faith effort to
resolve discovery disputes and must certify in writing efforts undertaken to resolve disputes).
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that order is response to growth in civil litigation and current
litigation practices that have imposed high cost on American individuals, businesses, industry,
professionals, and all levels of government).
40. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8.
41. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3640-41.
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determining how the final guidance could best refine the order's operation, and issue those final guidelines. 42 In the summer of 1992,
the Department also sought the perspectives of its own lawyers, federal agency counsel, and United States Attorneys on implementation of the guidelines. 48
After ajustice Department ad hoc committee received the submissions from government counsel, it evaluated the comments and revised the preliminary guidance in light of them.44 The committee
met numerous times after July 20, 1992, and drafted several iterations of the final guidelines. 45 The committee completed its work in
December 1992, and one of the final official acts of William Barr, the
Bush administration Attorney General, was signing the guidance on
January 15, 1993.46
Because the final guidelines that the Department ofJustice issued
inJanuary 1993 made comparatively few substantive changes in, and
indeed principally clarified, the preliminary guidance, the final
guidelines will be examined in the text of this Article only when they
elaborate or modify the preliminary guidance. Moreover, the final
guidelines are primarily described in this Part, while they are critically analyzed in the second Part of this Article. 4 7
ii. Description
Section 1 (a) of Executive Order 12,778 mandates that counsel for

the United States undertake reasonable efforts to no.ify persons
whom the Government is considering suing of government intent to
file suit and to afford the individuals an opportunity to settle the
controversy. 48 The content and timing of reasonable attempts depend on the particular circumstances of each case, and government
attorneys need not provide notice in unusual situations, such as
cases where notice would strategically disadvantage the United
42.

Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3640-41.

43. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1993).
44. Telephone Interview withJanice Calabresi, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 19, 1993).
45.

Id.

46. See Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6015 (noting that §§ 4(a), 4(b), and 7(d) of order
require Attorney General to coordinate efforts by federal agencies to implement reform, issue
guidelines, and define scope of order).
47. The description follows the requirements essentially as provided in the order, but
the critical analysis combines certain aspects of the requirements.
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(a), 3 C.F.R. 359, 360 (1991), reprintedin 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (declaring that no complaint initiating civil litigation shall be filed
before reasonable effort is made by government counsel to notify persons and attempt to
settle); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (stating that notice may be
provided either by agency or litigating counsel for purpose of settling dispute).
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States. 4 9
Section l(b) commands government lawyers to analyze the prospects for settlement whenever they secure adequate information. 50
Counsel thereafter have an ongoing responsibility to evaluate the
possibility of settlement and when appropriate must offer to participate in settlement conferences. 5 1 Section 1(c) is intended to encourage settlement by requiring that government lawyers
participate in ADR programs, if this activity will foster prompt, fair,
52
and efficient resolution of civil cases.
Section l(d) of the Executive order covers discovery. 53 Section
1(d)(1) pertains to the disclosure of core information.5 4 This subsection states that, early in civil actions, government attorneys must
49. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (stating that notice is not needed
where it would defeat purpose of litigation); see also Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6016 (noting that agency efforts to resolve disputes prior to litigation can afford requisite notice and
stating that government counsel need not repeat notice unless additional notice would be
productive).
50. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. at 360, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (requiring litigation counsel to make reasonable efforts toward settlement both before and during trial); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (suggesting that litigation
counsel meet with supervising attorney and affected agency to discuss acceptable terms of
settlement before settlement conference); Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6016 (stating that
litigation counsel should evaluate possibility of settlement throughout trial but that no unreasonable concession or offer should be extended nor any agency policy evaded for sake of
litigation position); infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing § 1(g) of Executive
order, which encourages early filing of motions that could resolve litigation, and observing
that when government attorneys do file early, they should not seek to participate in settlement
conferences until dispositive motions are resolved).
51. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (stating that litigation counsel
are to "move the court for such a conference" when reasonable).
52. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. at 360-61, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519
(stating that, when feasible, claims should be resolved through informal negotiations, discussions, and settlements before utilization of formal, structured ADR process or court proceeding, but that ADR process should be used where litigation counsel determines it is warranted
in context of particular claim and will materially contribute to prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of dispute); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (suggesting that
litigation counsel meet with affected agency concerning desirability of ADR procedure when
such procedures have likelihood of success). In making this decision, government counsel
"should consider the amount and allocation of the cost of employing ADR." Preliminary
Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641; see also Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6017 (stating that
each agency, when determining whether or not to use ADR, should utilize skill and training of
litigation counsel to ensure that use of such procedures in particular case will not result in
binding determination as to Government without exercise of agency's discretion; that manner
or terms of resolution will not compromise interest of United States; and that cost of using
ADR will not be exorbitant).
53. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(d), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519.
54. See id. § l(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (noting that "core information" includes names and addresses of people having relevant information and location of
relevant documents); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641-42 (discussing
§ I(d)(1) of order, which requires government counsel to make reasonable efforts to reach
agreement with opposing parties regarding exchange of information); supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that majority of EIDCs have adopted some form of mandatory
prediscovery disclosure and citing Civil Rules Committee's attempt to amend Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
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offer to participate in the mutual exchange of certain important material. 55 Counsel can only make such offers when no dispositive motions are pending, when other parties consent to exchange
analogous information, and when the court will enter that agree6
ment as a stipulated order.5
Section l(d)(2) governs the review of proposed document requests.5 7 Government lawyers can pursue the discovery of documents only after complying with requirements intended to ensure
that proposed discovery is reasonable in light of the circumstances
of the case.58 The attorneys must base the reasonableness decision
on enumerated considerations that are similar to those present in
rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The considerations
include: (1) whether the requests are duplicative, unduly burdensome, or expensive, given the requirements of the suit; (2) the
amount in controversy; (3) the importance of the questions at issue;
and (4) whether a more convenient way to secure the documents
exists. 59 Section 1(d)(3) mandates that government lawyers attempt
to resolve disagreements over discovery, including those involving
sanctions, with opposing counsel or pro se litigants before asking
the court to resolve the dispute. 60
55. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519; see
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641-42 (discussing requirement that government
attorneys must offer to exchange certain information at early stage of litigation).
56. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641-42; see also Memorandum, supra note
9, at 6017 (suggesting that agreement between parties, unless local practice warrants otherwise, should be by consent order to guarantee court enforcement). In ascertaining the practicability of compliance, counsel must consider factors such as the "utility of early issuenarrowing motions and devices, the scope and complexity of the disclosure that will be required[, and] the time available to comply with the requirement." Preliminary Memorandum,
supra note 8, at 3642.
57. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(requiring each agency within executive branch to establish coordinated procedure for conduct and review of document discovery, including but not limited to review by senior lawyer
prior to service of request to ensure that request is not cumulative, unreasonable, oppressive,
or unduly burdensome or expensive given relative importance of issues involved in litigation);
see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3642 (discussing § 1(d)(2) governing review
of proposed document request).
58. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519; see
also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3642 (noting that document discovery may be
pursued only after compliance with review procedures).
59. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § I (d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519. Compareid. with FED. R. Civ. P. 2 6 (g) (requiring attorney signature on every discovery request as
certification that request is consistent with rules of civil procedure, is warranted by existing
law or good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and is not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive given needs of case, previous discovery,
amount in controversy, and importance of issues at stake).
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(requiring both attempt to resolve dispute before petitioning court and that any discovery
motion concerning dispute be accompanied by representation that attempt at resolution was
either unsuccessful or impracticable under circumstances); see also Preliminary Memorandum,
supra note 8, at 3642 (stating that litigation counsel must try to resolve dispute with opposing
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Section 1(e) of the Executive order commands government attorneys to introduce only reliable expert testimony. 6 ' The lawyers
must rely on experts who possess specialized knowledge, have conducted research, or have other expertise in the applicable area and
who base their determinations on explanatory theories that are ac62
cepted by at least a substantial minority of experts in the field.
Section 1 (f) of the order covers motions for sanctions. 63 Government attorneys are to seek sanctions against opposing counsel and
parties when "appropriate," although government lawyers normally
must attempt to resolve controversies with the other side before filing sanctions motions. 64 All federal agencies are to designate
"sanctions officers" who must review proposals of government attorneys to request sanctions and motions that litigants file against
65
the United States.
Section 1(g) informs government lawyers that they must use efficient case management techniques and undertake reasonable attempts to expedite the resolution of civil lawsuits. 66 When proper,
party, but only if terms of compromise are reasonable). This requirement parallels the fifth
guideline of the CJRA. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (Supp. 1992) (listing, among other principles that district courts may adopt, requirement that discovery motions be accompanied by
certification that moving party has made reasonable, good faith effort to reach agreement with
opposing counsel).
61. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see
also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3642-43 (noting that existing widely used
practice among government attorneys to use only reliable experts enhances Government's
position in litigation). A reliable expert is one with substantial knowledge, background, research, or other expertise in a widely accepted field. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8,
at 3642. The requirement of reliable experts is more an evidentiary than a procedural requirement. See PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 9221028 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing general rules and principles applicable to courtroom use of
expert testimony and scientific evidence).
62. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § I(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(describing proper use of expert testimony, defining reliable expert testimony, and requiring
litigation counsel to engage in mutual disclosure of expert witness information to extent other
party agrees to comparable disclosure); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at
3642-43 (delineating elements of reliable expert testimony).
63. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(0, 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see also
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (discussing § 1(0).
64. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (stating that government attorneys should pursue sanctions against opposing parties only when there is well-founded basis
for such action). The order does not define "appropriate" but advises counsel to evaluate
their opponents' filings and to seek sanctions against "those responsible for abusive practices." Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(0, 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519.
65. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(0, 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (requiring submission of motion for sanctions to sanctions officer and requiring that sanctions
officer be senior supervising attorney within agency who is licensed to practice law before
state court, courts of District of Columbia, or other territories of United States); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (noting that sanctions officer should be attorney
with substantial litigation experience and supervisory authority).
66. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (stating that these efforts should include, but are not limited to: (1) making reasonable efforts to
negotiate; (2) narrowing issues by revising pleadings where appropriate; (3) requesting early
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government counsel are to seek summary judgment to terminate a
case or narrow the issues to be tried. 6 7 Government attorneys
should also attempt to stipulate undisputed facts and seek early trial
68
dates when appropriate.
Section 1(h) instructs government lawyers that they must offer to
enter agreements providing for two-way fee shifting with their opposition "to the extent permissible by law."'6 9 Review of relevant
authority by the Attorney General indicated that no legislation specifically provided for such agreements. 70 Accordingly, the Justice
Department informed government attorneys that they may not offer
to enter the agreements until Congress passes authorizing legisla7
tion or the Attorney General provides the requisite authority. '
In addition to section I of the order, which is titled "Guidelines
To PromoteJust and Efficient Government Civil Litigation, ' 72 there
are nine sections that provide other types of information, most of
which is less relevant to the issues treated in this Article. Several
sections are technical. Section 4 provides for Justice Department
coordination of agency efforts to implement the order's first and
third sections and empowers the Attorney General to promulgate
trial date; and (4) moving for summary judgment when motion is likely to prevail); see also
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (discussing § 1(g) of order and suggesting
that litigation counsel employ case management techniques in accord with order).
67. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519; see also
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (noting that government attorneys should

not, in pursuit of expedient case management, concede facts or issues that are reasonably in
dispute, uncertain, or without corroboration).
68. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519; Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643.
69. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(h), 3 C.F.R. at 362-63, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519
(requiring that in civil litigation involving disputes over federal contracts pursuant to 41
U.S.C. 99 601-613 or in any civil litigation initiated by United States, litigation counsel shall
offer to enter agreement whereby losing party pays prevailing party's legal fees and costs); see
also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (noting that order directs Attorney General to review legal basis for fee-shifting agreements).
70. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (observing absence of legislative
authority for fee-shifting agreements).
71. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643. The Department properly resolved
this issue. The Supreme Court recently proclaimed that the "allocation of the costs accruing
from litigation is a matter for the legislature, not the courts." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990). Moreover, Congress has explicitly rejected twoway fee shifting while enacting more than 100 statutes prescribing one-way fee shifting. See
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (appendix to opinion of Brennan,J., dissenting) (listing fee-shifting statutes enacted by Congress and separating statutes into three categories).
Justice Brennan found 69 statutes where attorney's fees are "part of cost"; 49 statutes where
attorney's fees are not "costs"; and 7 statutes allowing "cost and expenses including attorney's fees." Id.; see also infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing agencies' duty to
review proposed legislation or regulations prescribing certain types of fee-shifting
provisions).
72. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 360, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519.
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guidelines. 73 Section 5 defines "agency" and "litigation counsel;" 74
section 6 proclaims that the order creates no private rights that are
76
enforceable; 75 section 7 offers guidance as to the order's scope;
section 9 states that the order neither compels nor authorizes the
disclosure of privileged information; 77 and section 10 made the order effective ninety days after October 23, 1991.78
Section 2 prescribes principles that are intended to foster the passage of legislation and the promulgation of administrative regulations that do not unduly burden the federal judicial system. 7 9 The
section imposes general duties on agencies that are issuing or revising regulations, developing legislative proposals relating to regula73. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (instructing that guidelines promulgated by Attorney General shall serve as models for internal
guidelines issued by agencies pursuant to order); see also infra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text (describing § 3 of order, which directs administrative agencies, to extent possible, to implement recommendations of Administrative Conference of United States, as set forth in Case
Management as a Toolfor Improving Agency Adjudication, I C.F.R. §§ 305.86-87 (1991)).
74. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 5,3 C.F.R. at 365, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (defining
"agency" according to definition in 28 U.S.C. § 451, which excludes departments in legislative and judicial branches and defining "litigation counsel" as trial counsel in U.S. Attorney's
offices, Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, litigation division in Department ofJustice, attorneys
in agencies authorized to represent themselves, and any private counsel hired to represent
agency). The final guidance asserts that the definition of "agency" requires "independent"
agencies to comply with the order because the "President clearly has the authority to supervise and guide the exercise of core executive functions such as litigation by government agencies." Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019. This claim is debatable and may implicate the
Reagan administration's view that the President should have substantial control over the independent agencies. See Christopher C. Demuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075 (1986); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Wite a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1986); Steve
Nelson, OMB Should Steer Clear of Independent Agencies, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1985, at 2.
75. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 365-66, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (proclaiming that order does not create any right or benefit, either substantive or procedural, that
may be enforced by party against United States and proclaiming that order does not obligate
United States to accept particular settlement or alter standards for accepting settlements).
76. See id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 366, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (indicating that order does not
apply to criminal matters or proceedings in courts outside United States). Moreover, notice is
not required in numerous specific situations, principally when it would defeat the litigation's
purpose. See id. (stating that notice is not required in any action regarding assets subject to
forfeiture, or any action to seize property; in any bankruptcy, insolvency, conservatorship,
receivership, or liquidation proceedings; when assets in question are subject to flight, dissipation, or destruction; when defendant is subject to flight; or when otherwise impracticable).
Furthermore, the provisions on ADR and core disclosure do not apply to actions "to seize or
forfeit assets subject to forfeiture" or to debt collection cases involving less than $100 million.
Id.
77. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 9, 3 C.F.R. at 366, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519 (noting
that privileged data includes "sensitive law enforcement information [and] information affecting national security").
78. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 10, 3 C.F.R. at 367, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519.
79. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 363-65, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. Sections 2, 3 and 8 are less technical and have greater relevance to the issues addressed in this
article and therefore will be treated more thoroughly. Because the notions are not sufficiently
relevant to warrant extensive examination in the second Part of the Article, some commentary
on them appears in the following footnotes.
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tions, or drafting new legislation. 80 The section charges the
agencies to review such proposals for drafting mistakes and unnec-

essary ambiguity, to write them in ways that minimize needless litigation, and to draft proposals that prescribe clear and certain legal
standards for affected behavior and foster simplification and burden
8
reduction. '
Section 2 enumerates many specific issues that agencies are to
consider in discharging these general responsibilities. For instance,
agencies drafting proposed legislation and regulations must make
all reasonable efforts to guarantee that proposals clearly specify
their preemptive effect, if any, clearly specify their effect on current
federal law, if any, clearly specify their retroactive effect, if any, define their important terms, and provide clear and certain legal standards for affected conduct.8 2 The section also requires agencies to
review and perform cost-benefit analyses of any proposed legislation or regulations that permit attorney's fee awards in favor of one
class of litigants.83 Agencies must recommend against the adoption
of fee-shifting provisions when the costs of the provisions significantly outweigh any benefits, or when the prescriptions fail to detail
84
when awards of costs and fees are proper or to limit such awards.
Whenever agencies submit draft proposals to the Office of Management and Budget, the agencies must certify that they have complied
with the above requirements and justify any departures therefrom. 5
Section 3 prescribes principles that are intended to foster fair and
efficient resolution of administrative adjudications. 86 The section
instructs agencies that are adjudicating administrative claims to implement, insofar as is reasonable and practicable, certain recommendations covering case management that the Administrative
80. Id.
81. Id
82. See id., (stating that legislation should specify or address applicable statutes of limitation, whether private arbitration is appropriate, whether provisions are constitutionally severable, whether legislation applies to Federal Government, standards for governing assertion of
personal jurisdiction, and other issues affecting clarity and general drafting standards). These
general and specific duties may improve the quality of agency drafting efforts, although agencies already have significant incentives to draft the clearest possible proposals. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988) (attempting to bring clarity, definition, and
predictability to agency activities by requiring, among other things, that certain information
be made available to public, open meetings, notices of rulemakings, and procedures for implementing proposed rules).
83. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2(d), 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519.
84. Id. These requirements could directly affect the expense of litigation. Cf. supra note
71 (describing congressional opposition to fee shifting); infra notes 219-21 and accompanying
text (emphasizing importance of measures aimed directly at cost).
85. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. at 364-65, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 519.
86. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519.
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Conference has promulgated. 7 The Justice Department's final guidance elaborates by encouraging agencies to extend the application
of relevant components of the order's first section to counsel in administrative adjudications.88
Section 8 of the order provides that government attorneys are not
to interpret the order's constituent requirements in ways that conflict with the federal civil rules, federal or state law, additional applicable rules of procedure or practice, or court orders.8 9 The final
guidance states that government lawyers must comply with both the
order's provisions and the requirements of "applicable local rules or
court orders" when they overlap. 90
b. Implementation
SinceJanuary 1992, all counsel who litigate civil cases on behalf of
the United States Government, including lawyers in federal agencies, the Department of Justice, and the ninety-four local United
States Attorneys offices, are supposed to have implemented Executive Order 12,778 and the Justice Department guidance experimenting with executive branch reform. 9 1 Several factors complicate
the effort to ascertain exactly how the United States has effectuated
the Executive order and the guidelines, however.
First, government lawyers initially had less than six months to experiment with the order and the preliminary guidance and to submit
comments on their experiences, and many government attorneys
may have been uncertain as to how they were to proceed while the
Justice Department was finalizing the guidelines. Second, there are
thousands of government counsel with differing responsibilities for
litigating civil lawsuits. For example, attorneys in applicable divisions of the Justice Department or in the legal offices of numerous
87. Id.; see also Case Management as a Tool for Improving Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.86-7 (1992) (recommending that agencies, in both formal and informal adjudications,
should consider applying case management methods, including personnel management devices, step-by-step time goals, expedited options, case-file systems, two-stage resolution approaches, mediation, certain questioning techniques, time extension practices, joint
consideration of cases with common issues, telephone conferences and hearings, intra-agency
review, and training).
88. See Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019 (noting that although order does not require
application of § 1 to agency proceedings, application of relevant sections of order to such
proceedings is statutorily permissible); see also supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text (addressing application of § 1 of order to administrative adjudications).
89. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 8, 3 C.F.R. at 366, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519.
90. Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019. Unfortunately, neither the order nor the guidance treats the more difficult issue of how government lawyers are to resolve conflicts between the order and other applicable law. Cf infra notes 177-78, 192-96 and accompanying
text (detailing ways in which order overlaps with other law and explaining administrative effort needed to disseminate order's requirements to government attorneys).
91. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3640.
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agencies may have considerably more responsibility than the local
United States Attorneys offices for litigating many civil cases on behalf of the Government. 9 2 Third, it is very difficult to trace how the
contents of the order and the guidelines were communicated to all
government lawyers, how the attorneys understood and implemented them, and what counsel reported to the Justice Department
regarding their experimentation experiences. Nonetheless, some
highly generalized information can be derived from the Federal
Register notice that accompanied and explained issuance of the final
guidance. 93 Additional information can be obtained from interviews
with Justice Department personnel responsible for finalizing the
guidance, from interviews with government counsel responsible for
implementing executive branch reform, and from individuals knowledgeable about civil justice reform.
These sources indicate that government attorneys have undertaken minimal implementation of the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance. Moreover, the efforts to date have been
sporadic. Attorneys in federal agencies, the Department ofJustice,
and United States Attorneys Offices have varied significantly in
terms of the rigor and seriousness with which they implemented executive branch reform. There has been greater compliance within
the Justice Department than among federal agencies and United
States Attorneys Offices, as might be expected. 94 For example,
although a few United States Attorneys Offices have fully effectuated
the reform, some have only begun to implement it, and a number
have taken initial steps, such as instituting training sessions, toward
implementation. 9 5
Experimentation with the different aspects of the reform has also
varied considerably. For instance, government counsel implemented more broadly and quickly the components of the order that
92. For instance, the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Justice Department assumes responsibility for much civil litigation involving public lands. E.g., Federal
Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has similar responsibility for certain condemnation proceedings.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 404(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1988).
93. Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6015-19.
94. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, Director of Torts Branch, Civil Division,
U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1993).
95. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43. On November 25,
1991, the Justice Department sponsored a civil justice reform seminar for federal litigators.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
12778 1-89 (Nov. 25, 1991) (setting forth agenda of November 25, 1991 seminar and containing information concerning civil justice reform, including history and purpose of Executive
Order 12,778). On February 27, 1992, the Department's Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
sponsored "national broadcast training" on civil justice reform. See U.S. DrP'T OF JUSTICE,
CIVILJUSTICE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12778 37-47 (Feb. 27, 1992)
(on file with author) (presenting helpful overview of Order's practical aspects).
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resemble federal procedural rules. 96 Government lawyers concomitantly effectuated ADR less widely and promptly because of lingering concern about how best to implement the alternatives. 97 When
the Justice Department learned of this problem from responses to
its requests for comments, the Department circulated guidance on
ADR to government counsel in federal agencies and United States
Attorneys Offices, who now appear to be more comfortable with the
concept. 98 The above factors suggest that it is too early to ascertain
the effects, if any, on expense or delay of the reform's implementation. 99
The future of executive branch reform remains very much in flux
because the Clinton administration has not decided whether it will
retain the reform or, if retained, how the reform will be implemented. President Clinton has left in effect the Executive order that
President Bush promulgated, but has made no affirmative determination regarding the reform. 100 This inaction has correspondingly
led to uncertainty about the reform among government lawyers.
The former Acting Attorney General, Stuart Gerson, and many Justice Department personnel considered themselves caretakers and,
therefore, made little policy in the area of executive branch reform.101 The major exception to this was in the area of generic procedures, such as those prescribing ADR, which seemed sufficiently
efficacious and apolitical that the Justice Department has continued
02
to promote their application. 1
It is too early to ascertain howJanet Reno, the new Attorney Gen96. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43; see also supra notes 54-60
and accompanying text (analyzing Executive order components resembling federal proce-

dural rules).
97. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 94; see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text (indicating that Executive order § 1(c) encourages settlement through
ADR).
98.

Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43; see also ADR GUIDANCE,

supra note 31, at 12-14 (setting forth, inter alia, characteristics of cases suitable for ADR and
procedures for selection of cases for ADR); supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text
(describing government requests for comments on reforms and government's resulting revi-

sion of preliminary guidance).
99. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 94; Telephone Interview with
Jinice Calabresi, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. (June 29, 1992); Telephone Interview with Timothy
Naccarato, supra note 43.

100. Telephone Interview withJanice Calabresi, supra note 99; Telephone Interview with
Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43; cf Carl Tobias, Litigating withJustice: A Civil Agenda, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at 22 [hereinafter Tobias, Litigatingwith Justice] (suggesting that Clinton
administration vigorously implement executive branch reform).
101. Telephone Interview withJanice Calabresi, supra note 99; Telephone Interview with
Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43.
102. See ADR GUIDANCE, supra note 31, at 14 (setting forth procedures for selection of
cases for ADR).
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eral, will treat executive branch civil justice reform. In an address at
an April national conference on civil justice reform, Ms. Reno characterized the commitment to the area of civil justice reform as one
of the most significant that the Justice Department could undertake
and outlined her approach to the field:
I want to approach it in a nonpartisan, careful, thoughtful way,
through the creation in the Department of Justice of something
akin to the old Office ofJustice Improvement, an office where we
can focus on the issues of civil justice reform without buzz words,
without labels, and without political debate, looking at what is
best for the system, looking at issues of alternative dispute resolution, of case management, of what to do about punitive damages,
of product liability reforms, of prefiling requirements, and of early
03
settlement provisions.1
2. Legislative proposal
The Bush administration also proposed legislation covering civil
justice reform. It based the proposal on the suggestions of the
Council on Competitiveness Working Group on Civil Justice Reform, found in the entity's August 1991 report. 10 4 On February 4,
1992, Senator Charles Grassley and Representative Hamilton Fish
introduced the administration's civil justice reform legislation in
Congress. 105
The measure consists principally of procedural requirements resembling those prescribed in or implemented pursuant to the CJRA
or included in Executive Order 12,778. For instance, one section of
the bill mandates that a district in every circuit institute a multidoor
courthouse program for three years. 10 6 Under this section, the
courts would have to implement ADR plans that permit parties to
choose specific techniques for resolving cases without litigation,
such as arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trials. 10 7 This prescription, therefore, could essentially
replicate efforts that numerous EIDCs have already instituted, that
many of the remaining districts may initiate, and that government
counsel are currently implementing.10 8 Another section of the pro103. U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, Address Before the National Conference on Civil
Justice Reform (Apr. 21, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File.
104. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 15-27 (Aug. 1991) (providing civil justice reform recommendations).
105. See S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (stating bill's purpose as providing "greater
access to civil justice by reducing cost and delay"); H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(same).
106. S. 2180, supra note 105, § 7; H.R. 4155, supra note 105, § 7.
107. S. 2180, supra note 105, § 7; H.R. 4155, supra note 105, § 7.
108. See, e.g., supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (describing EIDCs' civil justice
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posed legislation mandates that plaintiffs afford potential defendants written notice of their claims and actual damages sought prior
to filing actions. 109 This stricture mirrors a requirement that the
Executive order imposes. 110
Additional facets of the legislative proposal, such as the provision
for fee shifting in diversity cases, are very controversial."' In fact,
the bill is unlikely to pass in 1993, because the proposal includes
these controversial measures and replicates the CJRA and its implementation considerably more than the Executive order. 112 The defeat of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration's
probable opposition to the bill also suggest that its passage in 1993
is doubtful." 13
II.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM

A. A Word About Assessment

Several difficulties complicate evaluation of the executive branch
civil justice reform instituted by the Bush administration. First, government attorneys have undertaken only skeletal implementation of
the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance.1 14 Effectuation has generally been sporadic and has varied significantly
reform efforts); supra notes 52, 97 and accompanying text (noting government implementation of Executive Order 12,778).
109. S. 2180, supra note 105, § 5; H.R. 4155, supra note 105, § 5.
110. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (describing similar requirements in
§ l(a) of Executive order).
111. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (supporting assertion that feeshifting provisions are controversial because legislation did not explicitly require such provisions). See generally supra notes 69-71, 84 and accompanying text (explaining government restrictions on implementation of fee-shifting provision).
112. Compare S. 2180, supra note 105, § 3 (stating that prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys' fees "only to the extent that such party prevails on any position or claim
advanced during the action") with Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp.
1992) (promulgating provisions replicated in S. 2180 but without mention of fee-shifting provisions) and Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(h), 3 C.F.R. at 362-63, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(instructing government attorneys to enter into fee-shifting agreements "to the extent permissible by law").
113. See Tobias, Clinton Administration,supra note 4, at 443 (describing bill provisions that
are likely to prevent timely passage). Indeed, Congress failed to schedule a hearing on the
proposal during 1992. Id. Near the end of Congress' last session, Senator DeConcini introduced a bill to establish a National Commission on Civil Justice Reform. See S. 3333, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing national civil justice reform commission to examine and
develop solutions to civil justice problems). He intended the proposal to "address the inability of the current administration and Congress to develop a comprehensive legislative proposal for civil justice reform." 138 CONG. REc. S 16,994 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini). Senator DeConcini has cosponsored the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1993.
See S. 585, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
114. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete implementation
of Executive order).
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among theJustice Department, the federal agencies, and the ninetyfour United States Attorneys Offices, as well as within the entities'
different components." 5 These factors indicate that there has been
virtually no assessment of the efficacy of the procedures by, for example, establishing baselines and attempting to ascertain whether
and how substantially the procedures have reduced litigation ex16
pense and delay.
Even had experimentation been more systematic and uniform,
and had measures been instituted to evaluate efficacy, those efforts
would have left untreated the procedures' detrimental side effects,
namely the potential for less accurate dispute resolution, and significant process values, such as fairness and justice, that the CJRA and
the Executive order expressly mandate be considered. ' 17 For instance, if resource-poor litigants who were participating in
mandatory ADR felt compelled, by monetary restraints or by pressure from adversaries or judicial officers, to settle for less than their
cases were actually worth, the parties' opponents and the courts
would save money and time, but such savings would be at the litigants' expense in terms of compensation and fairness. 1 8
In short, it is problematic to define cost and delay and to analyze
115. See Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 89,
110 (1993) (noting that relatively few U.S. Attorneys offices in Fourth Circuit have effectuated
executive branch reform); Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 94 (noting
that Torts Branch of Department of Justice Civil Division is fully implementing reforms set
forth in Executive order); see also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (indicating that
government attorneys generally have been slow to implement reform).
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting that because consistent implementation of reform did not occur, it is too early to conduct meaningful evaluation of reform's
effects); see also Carl Tobias, Recalibratingthe CivilJustice Reform Act, 30 HARV.J. ON LEcis. 115,
124 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Recalibratingthe CJRA] (asserting that few districts have established expense and delay baselines necessary to measure progress).
117. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992) (stating that civil justice plans' purposes are to
"ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions"); Exec. Order No., 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg.
55,195, 55,195 (1991) (propounding order's purpose to "promote fair and prompt adjudication"); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1463, 1466-71
(1987) (discussing process values); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 107678 (1984) (discussing process values and criticizing imbalance of power between parties as
justification for ADR).
118. This example also implicates the difficult questions of defining and measuring costs
and determining who bears those expenses. See Tobias, Recalibratingthe CJRA, supra note 116,
at 124 (noting that few districts have determined how costs should be defined and allocated
among parties); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Altorney: The Implications of
Economic Theoiy for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 677-84 (1986) (arguing that poorer litigants involved in class actions tend to have
little control over their own cases); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L.
REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights] (analyzing difficulties that resource-poor litigants confront despite congressional passage of numerous statutes suggesting
that federal courts should be solicitous of litigants' needs). But cf Carl Tobias, Updating Civil
Justice Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 89, 95 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Updating Civil
Justice Reform) (providing evidence suggesting that certain repeat players, namely insurers,
choose state forum out of concern about pressures in settlement conferences).
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accurately expense and delay reduction. It is even more difficult,
however, to articulate, measure, and value certain side effects and
concerns significant to the civil litigation process. Even more complicated is attempting to balance meaningfully all of the considerations that are relevant in determining whether executive branch civil
justice reform should proceed and, if so, under what circumstances.
Notwithstanding these problems, it is possible to offer a preliminary assessment of the Executive order, the Justice Department guidance, and their nascent implementation. This can be achieved
principally by examining the procedures that are being applied in
the executive branch effort in light of prior or ongoing experimentation with the same or analogous procedures. For instance, many
years before the CJRA's passage, a number of federal judges, particularly in the Northern District of California, had been experimenting with various case management techniques. 119 Similarly,
numerous courts had been experimenting with certain forms of
ADR, such as summary jury trials, 120 and judges across the nation
1 21
had been experimenting with court-annexed arbitration.
Indeed, Congress relied substantially on this earlier experimentation when prescribing the eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques in the CJRA, mechanisms that most EIDCs are presently
implementing. 22 One measure of the executive branch procedures'
efficacy, therefore, could be whether Congress deemed the procedures sufficiently effective to warrant prescription in the 1990 Act.
This yardstick is somewhat unrefined because the efficacy of certain
principles, guidelines, and techniques remains controversial 123 and
because Congress did not consider the enumerated factors to be all119. See Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Casefrom Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 779-89 (1981) (evaluating pretrial case management techniques used in Northern District of California); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 386-91 (1982) (describing various models of judicial case
management).
120. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lambros, The SummaryJury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 474-75 (1984) (noting courts' use of summary jury trial as
cost-saving device). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trialand Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 366, 385-89
(1986) (criticizing summary jury trials as not having positive impact on settlement rates).
121. See BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT
CouRTs 13-18 (1990) (discussing ways in which courts have experimented with arbitration
programs). Congress stamped its imprimatur on this experimentation in the 1988 Judicial
Improvements Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988) (providing arbitration system for federal
courts).
122. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (indicating EIDC implementation of 11
principles prescribed by Congress).
123. Some procedures used earlier were and remain controversial. See, e.g., Posner, supra
note 120, at 385-89 (criticizing summaryjury trials). Moreover, a few observers have asserted
that Congress based the CJRA's procedures substantially on political factors. See Avern Cohn,
A Judge's View of CongressionalAction Affecting the Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991,
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inclusive.1 24 The mere statutory prescription of procedures or prior
experimentation with those procedures or other measures does not
necessarily insure that the procedures will reduce expense or delay
or that they will be free from deleterious side effects or will honor
important process values.
In sum, a preliminary assessment of the executive branch procedures can be provided primarily by considering them in light of
identical or similar mechanisms with which courts have experimented prior to the CJRA's enactment or pursuant to that legislation. The procedures' efficacy can be evaluated in terms of reducing
expense, delay, and the detrimental side effects and significant process values that the provisions' application implicates. Analysis of
how specific procedures could prove problematic or effective precedes a summary by way of general examination.
B.
1.

Specific Procedures

Discovery

The United States Department of Justice touted the discovery
provisions as one of the reform's principal components.1 2 5 Many
attorneys believe that difficulties with discovery, particularly its
abuse, cause much expense and delay in civil litigation.1 2 6 Chief
Judge Robert Parker, the Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, has characterized excessive discovery as the "single greatest factor that
contributes to unacceptable cost." 12 7
The requirements pertaining to the disclosure of core information are problematic in several respects. 12 8 Most important, they
at 99, 103 (concluding that CJRA was "driven by special interests"); see also Mullenix, supra
note 2, at 396-407 (describing political process from which CJRA evolved).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. 1992) (instructing, in sixth open-ended technique,

that each court should include in civil justice plan "such other features as the district court
considers appropriate" after considering its advisory group's recommendations).
125. See Memorandum, supra note 9,at 6018 (describing reform's discovery component).

126. See Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Obser.ationsby Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 219, 229-35 (describing attorney criticisms
of discovery process in large cases); William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Pro.
cess, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703, 703 (1989) (stating that "discovery now
tends to dominate . . . litigation and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens"). But see
Thomas M. Mengler, EliminatingAbusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is ItAgain Timefor Reform?,
138 F.R.D. 155, 161 n.33 (1991) (citing authorities in support of proposition that discovery

abuse is not rampant).
127.

Memorandum on Civil Justice Reform Act Implementation from Robert M. Parker,

ChairJudicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to ChiefJudges, U.S. Courts of Appeals, ChiefJudges, U.S. District Courts, and Chairs,
Advisory Groups (Oct. 22, 1992) (on file with The American University Law Review).
128. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (describing discovery provisions of Executive order).
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are less stringent, in terms of what must be divulged and the disclosure's timing, than the strictures that the Federal Rules proposal
would impose and that numerous EIDCs have implemented pursuant to the CJRA. 129 For instance, the executive branch reform requires that parties voluntarily divulge some helpful material, such as
the names and addresses of potential witnesses and the location of
relevant documents, during discovery.130 In contrast, the Federal
Rules proposal, and a number of courts under the CJRA, call for the
automatic disclosure of that information, as well as considerably
more information such as data compilations, damages computations, and relevant insurance agreements, within thirty days of the
service of defendant's answer.13 1
Even if the executive branch disclosure requirements were more
demanding, the proviso that they are inapplicable while a dispositive
motion is pending 3 2 severely undercuts the strictures' effectiveness.
The United States frequently files questionable motions to dismiss
that courts do not resolve promptly, often triggering governmental
requests for discovery stays.' 33 These developments would suspend
governmental responsibility to comply while consequently halting
the progress of cases.
The above difficulties, principally implicating the efficacy of the
executive branch disclosure requirements, are compounded by the
uncertainty surrounding the Federal Rules proposals on which
many EIDCs premised their prediscovery disclosure procedures.
Most of the EIDCs relied on the notion that material "bear signifi34
cantly on any claim or defense," which appeared in a 1991 draft;'
the rule revisors, however, subsequently replaced that concept with
the idea of "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts al129. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting prediscovery provisions prescribed
by EIDCs).
130. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing discovery section of Executive order); see also DonJ. DeBenedictis, PanelRaps Bush's Order, 78 A.B.A.J., Oct. 1992, at 40
(suggesting that requiring Government to disclose potential witness information is already
"typical litigation practice" and thus is not substantive reform).
131. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, supra note 37, at 3-5, reprintedin 137 F.R.D. at
66-68 (noting information required to be disclosed under proposal). The proposal also imposes a continuing duty to update disclosures. Id.
132. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. 359, 361 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991).
133. See Letter from John W. Toothman, Esq., Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker,
Alexandria, Va., to Carl Tobias, Professor of Law, University of Montana (Dec. 31, 1992) (on
file with The American University Law Review) (asserting that order's discovery provision is ineffective due to slow resolution of preliminary motions).
134. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, supra note 37, at 14, 137 F.R.D. at 87-88 (requiring under rule 26(a)(1)(B) that litigants supply information "concerning documents, data
compilations, and tangible things ... likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense").
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leged with particularity in the pleadings."1 3 5 Even though the
Supreme Court recently approved this formulation, Congress may
well alter it.136
The two other subparts of the Executive order's discovery section
promise to have no more impact than provision for the disclosure of
core information. The requirements covering review of proposed
document requests essentially import discovery strictures that are
present in current federal rule 26,137 prescriptions with which government attorneys should already be complying. The order's procedures relating to discovery motions, which require that government
lawyers make reasonable efforts to resolve discovery disputes with
adversaries before filing motions and to so state in those papers,
effectively replicate a measure prescribed in the CJRA' 38 that numerous EIDCs have instituted.' 3 9 When these provisions do not resolve discovery controversies, the requirements that counsel
participate in more activities will increase litigation expenses.'4 0
Notwithstanding the above problems, the discovery commands
could effect some savings of money and time. Insofar as government attorneys comply with the strictures regarding disclosure of
core information to divulge relevant material early in a case, this
135. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 37, at 72; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing EIDC discovery provisions).
136. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365,4372-76 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (proposing amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Numerous elements of the organized bar opposed the 1991
draft, but many constituents believe the new iteration to be an improvement. See Samborn,
supra note 37, at 12-13 (noting attorney satisfaction with final draft). Nonetheless, some critics may ask Congress to change the proposal. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text
(noting author's belief that pressure to modify proposals may be exerted). See generally Linda
S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69
N.C. L. REv. 795, 801 (1991) (predicting that formulation of new discovery rules will be affected by political pressures); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D.
139, 139 (1993) (stating that "procedural reform efforts are on a collision course" due to
inaction of federal judiciary).
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), (g) (providing federal discovery rules for civil cases); see also
supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (comparing pertinent federal civil procedure rules
with proposed Executive order provisions governing discovery).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (requiring that party moving for discovery motion first make "reasonable and good faith effort" to reach agreement with opposing party); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting implementation by EIDCs of
provision requiring efforts to reach agreement between parties before discovery motions will
be heard).
139. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MONT., CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN 17 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter Dissrmcr OF MONTANA PLAN] (establishing new

discovery procedures for court); supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting other courts'
adoption of similar approaches).
140. See Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1415 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Balhanization of Federal Civil Procedure]
(arguing that expediting discovery process may actually increase litigation expenses and cause
problems for litigants with limited resources).
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activity may expedite and streamline discovery.' 4 ' To the extent

that these lawyers implement the requirements regarding document
requests, compliance could both decrease the number of government requests and make them more routine and, thus, contribute to
cost and temporal savings.' 4 2 When the strictures on discovery motions lead to the resolution of discovery disputes, the resources of
parties and courts will be conserved through a reduction in the
143
number of filings.
2. Sanctions
Much of what is included in the Executive order's provision for
sanctions 44 seems unwarranted. Requiring government counsel to
scrutinize their opponents' papers for deficiencies and seek sanctions when appropriate could unduly emphasize technical niceties in
pleadings, 4 5 foster unnecessary satellite litigation, 46 and promote
incivility among attorneys.' 4 7 These detrimental impacts will increase expense and delay, particularly disadvantaging resource-poor
litigants. 48 Moreover, the Justice Department had previously fol141. I recognize that this is a significant caveat. See supra notes 54-56, 133 and accompanying text (presenting and criticizing Executive order's discovery provision).
142. See supra notes 57-60, 137 and accompanying text (describing Executive order provisions governing review of proposed document requests and comparing provisions with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
143. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing Executive order provision requiring attempt by parties to resolve discovery disputes); see also supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (criticizing aforementioned Executive order provision).
144. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing Executive order's sanctions
provision).
145. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (presenting Executive order § 1(f) requirements, which may lead to unnecessary emphasis on technical wording of legal motions).
Such scrutiny and the resulting conflicts over opponents' documents would contravene the
drafters' intent in adopting original rule 8 that pleading be liberal and flexible. See
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160,
1163 (1993) (holding that federal courts may not employ heightened standard of pleading
beyond "liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules"); FED. R. Civ. P.
8(e)(1) (stating that "no technical forms of pleadings or motions are required"); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact PleadingUnder the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 433,434-40 (1986) (describing liberal intent of rule 8 drafters). See generally Carl Tobias,
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 296-301
(1989) (explaining rule 8 pleading standards).
146. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 122-24 (2d Cir.)
(illustrating how attorney's fee sanctions can lead to satellite litigation), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
918 (1987); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformationof American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (citing conflicts among circuit courts on
"1practically every important question of interpretation and policy" relating to rule 11 sanctions); Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 514 (noting how rule 11 has "exacerbated,"
rather than cured, litigation abuse).
147. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 515 (emphasizing ways in which federal
sanction rules have caused conflicts among attorneys).
148. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 1340
(1986) (stating that attorneys may be reluctant to bring civil rights suits for fear of being
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lowed a properly measured informal policy of pursuing sanctions
only in cases of egregious litigation abuse. 149
The Executive order's requirements covering sanctions could be
less problematic than they appear, depending on how the provisions
are interpreted and implemented. For instance, government counsel may only request that judges sanction "those responsible for
abusive practices."' 150 Although abuse is not defined, the abuse idea
seems inconsistent with the requirement that papers be scrutinized
for technical flaws. 15 ' Courts have experienced difficulty applying
the abuse concept in the context of sanctions disputes, and use of
the notion could impose a relatively high threshold and make this
aspect of the reform resemble the prior Justice Department policy
52
on sanctions.
If the Government were to pursue sanctions vigorously in appropriate circumstances, parties and lawyers could be deterred from filing frivolous claims against the United States. 55 The strictures on
sanctions should also serve to make governmental sanctions practices more consistent and routine.154 Insofar as government counsel might file unwarranted motions seeking sanctions, the
procedures provide the safeguard of mandating that attorneys secure approval from specifically designated sanctions officers,
thereby limiting the potential for "arbitrariness and caprice" which
might attend government requests for sanctions. 155
3.

Expert witnesses

Certain provisions pertaining to expert witnesses are essentially
sanctioned if suits are deemed frivolous); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118
F.R.D. 189, 200-02 (1988) (confirming commentators' views that fear of sanctions may lead to

fewer suits on behalf of poor plaintiffs).
149.

See Carl Tobias, EnvironmentalLitigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 460

(1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Environmental Litigation] (explaining that government attorneys
only pursue sanctions when opposing party has "seriously abused the litigation process").
150. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643.
151. See supra note 64 (discussing recommendation in Executive Order 12,778 that attorneys evaluate opposing counsels' filings).
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (describing government policy to pursue
sanctions only in circumstances of extreme abuse); see also William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1015-17 (1988)(citingjudicial difficulty of defining and applying
abuse standard uniformly).
153. See Tobias, Litigating with Justice, supra note 100, at 22 (arguing that Government
should adopt Executive order provisions, including standards specifying situations in which
Government should pursue sanctions); see also Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 1017-18 (noting
that deterrence of frivolous claims was principal purpose of rule I l's 1983 amendment).
154. Cf supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing appointment of "sanctions of.
ficers" to monitor Government's motions for sanctions).
155. See DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40 (reporting comments of former Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing appointment
of government officers to review sanctions motions).
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required, are controversial, or could prejudice the United States
case. 15 6 For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence effectively allow expert testimony only from individuals who possess expertise in
relevant areas. 15 7 The mandate that government attorneys present
in court only reliable expert testimony implicates the heated, un-

resolved debate in the scientific and legal communities over "junk
science."' 5 8 Limiting government counsel in this way may also strategically disadvantage the United States in cases involving signifi-

cant issues

of science,

technology,

public health,

and

the

environment. For instance, when the Government seeks to impose

responsibility for environmental degradation on industry defendants in suits that raise close, complex questions of causation, the

defendants might be able to call witnesses whom the United States
could not. The application of these requirements, however, might
help to resolve some of the controversy that currently surrounds the
employment of experts and may serve as a model for private litigants and lawyers. For example, restricting government witnesses

to reliance on widely accepted theories while proscribing contingent
fees may be instructive experiments that will improve prevailing

practices in the expert testimony area.' 5 9
4.

Settlement
The requirements pertaining to settlement in three subsections of

the Executive order essentially embody good litigation practice or

correspondingly mandate procedures that government counsel already follow in most civil cases.' 60 The command that government
lawyers attempt to settle controversies before filing complaints al156. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining Executive order provision
restricting Government's offering of expert testimony).
157. See FED. R. EvIo. 702 (placing restrictions on admissibility of expert testimony); cf.
Weinstein, supra note 2, at 636-39 (discussing proposed amendments that would strengthen
rule 702, which governs expert testimony).
158. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE 2-6 (1991) (describing "junk science" as
"speculative theory that expects lawyersjudges, and juries to search for causes at the fringes
of science and beyond"); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320
(1992) (granting certiorari to resolve issues relating to offering of scientific expert testimony).
159. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing Executive order's restrictions on government use of expert witnesses). The application of certain requirements to
public interest litigants such as injured individuals or environmental plaintiffs could seriously
disadvantage them. See John W. Toothman, Agenda to Nowhere: The President's Civil Justice Reforms 6 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with The American University Law Review)
(arguing that proposed reform is "designed to increase the risks to those with limited resources"); see also Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (arguing that narrow application of procedural rules has significant impact on civil rights plaintiffs).
160. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing Executive order provisions
already largely followed by government attorneys).
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ready occurs in many circumstances.16 1 The notice requirement
could also prejudice the United States in the smaller number of situ-

ations where potential defendants behave improperly by, for in162
stance, fleeing or destroying relevant documents.

The order's prescriptions on government participation in settlement conferences and concomitantly ADR16 3 will be minimally more
effective than the notice concept discussed in the previous paragraph. For instance, the Government now actively participates in
these forms of dispute resolution.' 6 4 Involvement in settlement
conferences and ADR can disadvantage resource-poor litigants,
which may include the Government when it is aligned against certain regulated interests, such as the petroleum industry. 6 5 Judges
and parties in settlement conferences may unduly pressure litigants
with limited funding who might believe that resistance will prejudice
their cases or lead to sanctions.' 66 Participation in these conferences and various forms of ADR can correspondingly deplete parties' scarce resources without moving cases closer to resolution on
16 7
the merits.
The prescriptions covering settlement could effect significant expense and delay reductions for the Government, for lawyers and litigants whom the Government opposes, and for the judiciary.' 6 8
161. See Toothman, supra note 159, at 4 (noting that government lawyers generally attempt settlement before filing ofsuit); see also DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40 (arguing that
reform is unhelpful because it requires actions that already occur).
162. See Toothman, supra note 159, at 4 (suggesting that "every practicing lawyer" has had
client who fled or shredded documents prior to suit). But see supra notes 49, 76 and accompanying text (discussing Executive order provision for situations where notice is not required,
thus alleviating concerns about defendants who might flee or shred documents).
163. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing Executive order provisions
requiring use of settlement conferences and ADR techniques).
164. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing ADR methods already
largely followed by government attorneys).
165. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1375-83, 1400-04 (describing potential
prejudices in ADR system and concluding that ADR should be used only when parties are of
equal economic strength). See generally Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REv. 889, 914-28 (1991) (providing critical analysis of ADR);
Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (describing ways in which inherent characteristics of civil rights cases cause such cases to be adversely affected by forms of ADR).
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing unique burdens ADR places on
resource-poor litigants); see also Tobias, EnvironmentalLitigation, supra note 149, at 455-56 (noting that government attorneys as repeat players may be reluctant to jeopardize ongoing relations with judges); supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing court-imposed sanctions
for litigants who are perceived to have not participated in good faith).
167. Cf Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (explaining special challenges faced
by civil rights litigants).
168. Cf supra note 21 and accompanying text (citingJudicial Improvements Act's mandate
that federal district court advisory groups' recommendations must consider impact of expense
and delay on judicial system); infra note 205 and accompanying text (suggesting that Executive order's prescriptions reducing expense and delay may cause government attorneys to be
more receptive to ADR).
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Requiring that the United States provide notice and attempt to settle cases before filing, as well as increased participation of the Government in settlement conferences and ADR, may foster earlier
resolution of a greater number of civil cases, particularly before
trial. Insofar as these measures' invocation results in more lawsuits
being terminated sooner in the litigation process, and even outside
the traditional courtroom procedures, parties, attorneys, and judges
will realize savings.
5. Case management
The Executive order's instructions requesting the employment of
efficient case management mechanisms and reasonable efforts to expedite the resolution of civil suits can be criticized for reasons similar to those regarding settlement and ADR. 169 For example, the
requirements that government counsel negotiate with other litigants
and stipulate to undisputed facts, seek early trial settings, and move
for summary judgment when appropriate are typical litigation practices. 170 Numerous courts have effectively imposed, under federal
rule 11, the order's command that government lawyers review and
17
revise pleadings to reflect information derived from discovery, '
1 72
although this activity can be expensive and unnecessary.
The Executive order's provision for using efficient techniques of
case management and making reasonable attempts to expedite civil
cases could reduce expense and delay.1 73 For instance, undertaking
reasonable efforts to agree on facts that are not in dispute, request169. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (explaining § 1(g) of order, which commands government lawyers to seek expeditious resolution of civil lawsuits); see also supra text
accompanying notes 165-67 (suggesting that settlements and ADR may unfairly pressure resource-poor litigants to avoid pursuit of meritorious cases).
170. Cf supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (restating elements of order that instruct government attorneys to expedite civil lawsuits); cf. also Toothman, supra note 159, at 7
(noting ineffectiveness of warning government attorneys to seek early trial dates and narrow
issues in pleadings, as attorneys often deliberately impede pretrial process).
171. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 489-501 (documenting judicial enforcement of rule 11 requirements); see also Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(g)(2), 3 C.F.R. 359, 362
(1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. III 1991) (ordering counsel to review and revise
papers to guarantee their accuracy and ensure that they reflect narrowing of issues resulting
from discovery).
172. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 868-69 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11] (arguing that proposed rule 11 duty to revise pleadings
would burden attorneys and parties, add unwarranted expense to litigation, and generally
complicate lawsuits); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text (suggesting that requiring
attorneys to inspect their opponents' papers could promote unnecessary emphasis on technical aspects of pleadings).
173. See Tobias, Clinton Administration,supra note 4, at 444 (suggesting that while ultimate
effectiveness of executive branch civil justice reform remains unclear, certain procedures such
as mediation, ADR, and participation in settlement conferences could expedite resolution of
civil litigation).
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ing early trial dates, and moving for summary judgment to narrow
the issues may decrease delay and thereby save some expense. I7 4
The subsections of the Executive order that were not discussed or
were treated minimally in the text above warrant little additional examination here.' 7 5 Most of these elements are good litigation practice, introduce no new requirements, or seem ineffective, and
impose on government attorneys duties with which they now can, or
must, comply under the CJRA, federal or local rules, or other procedural requirements.
C.
1.

GeneralAssessment

Inadvisable and less advisable aspects

One significant problem with executive branch reform is that it
institutes few procedures that promise to reduce expense or delay
that judges, lawyers, or litigants could not already invoke, especially
pursuant to the CJRA, or that are not now good litigation practice
for most attorneys and parties, particularly the United States and its
counsel. A side-by-side comparison of the Executive order's requirements and the CJRA's eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques reveals that practically all of the executive branch procedures
are identical or similar to those listed in the Act, which the ninetyfour districts must consider and may adopt.17 6 For instance, the order's provisions for settlement, ADR, and discovery replicate or resemble the statutorily prescribed principles, guidelines, and
77
techniques. 1
Another important difficulty is the significant administrative effort
that the reform's proper implementation will necessitate. The
thousands of government lawyers who work in the Justice Department, federal agencies, and United States Attorneys Offices must
174. See infra notes 215, 217-18 and accompanying text (documenting attempts by EIDCs
to reduce delay and thereby reduce cost of civil litigation). But see infra notes 182-84 and
accompanying text (notingJustice Department practice of relitigating same substantive legal
issue in different jurisdictions, thus depleting time and resources of parties).
175. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text (providing brief explanation of Executive order sections that address technical aspects of reform).
176. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359, 359-67 (1991), reprintedin 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (containing executive branch civil justice reform prescription) with 28
U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 11 1990) (setting forth statutory plan for reduction of civil litigation expense and delay).
177. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,778, §§ 1(a)-(d), 3 C.F.R. at 360-61, reprintedin 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (explaining cost-saving prescriptions of Executive order) with 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)-(6)
(Supp. 11 1990) (establishing guidelines for cost reduction and expedition of civil litigation).
Congress or the rule revisors have rejected several other provisions, such as those governing
fee shifting and sanctions. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting congressional and
Justice Department rejection of two-way fee shifting); infra text accompanying notes 236-37
(noting Judicial Conference's intention to limit applicability of rule 11 sanctions).
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become aware of, understand, comply with, and consistently effectuate the executive branch procedures. This is particularly difficult
because government counsel, their opponents, and judges will have
to integrate the strictures with other applicable procedures.
Those procedures include the requirements appearing in the civil
justice plans that every district must promulgate by December 1993,
the existing Federal Rules and Federal Rule proposals (such as
those governing mandatory prediscovery disclosure) that are scheduled to become effective the same month, 178 and the disuniform lo79
cal rules currently applicable in each of the ninety-four districts.'
Understanding and reconciling these procedures will be especially
burdensome for Justice Department and agency counsel and their
adversaries, who typically participate in civil litigation in multiple
districts.
2. Advisable aspects
The executive branch reform would at least require that all government attorneys comply with procedures that could reduce expense and delay. 18 0 In many situations, government lawyers have
few incentives to expedite civil suits. The United States is a defendant in a number of these cases, and adverse decisions will require
that the Government pay damages, initiate appeals or institute additional actions with which it disagrees. Delayed resolution can also
save the United States the money and time that must otherwise be
expended on pretrial discovery and trying suits. Delay correspondingly affords the Government tactical benefits against parties with
limited resources who could be dissuaded from vigorously pursuing
litigation.
The substantive policies and political perspectives of the presidential administration that is in power can also lead government
counsel to delay in civil cases. In the administration of President
Ronald Reagan, for example, government attorneys often raised du178. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussingJudicial Conference proposal for
mandatory prediscovery disclosure submitted to Supreme Court in September 1992 and forwarded by Court to Congress in April 1993).
179. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT:

LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE

(1989) (examining local rules of 94 district courts, identifying inconsistencies among rules,
and reviewing underlying policies of rules); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1999, 2020-26 (1989) (reporting findings on proliferation and diversity of local rules).
180. See Tobias, Litigating with Justice, supra note 100, at 22 (suggesting methods Justice
Department may implement to realize cost-saving and delay-reducing goals of civil justice
reform); cf. Toothman, supra note 159, at 6-7 (condemning suggestions proposed by executive
branch designed to expedite civil litigation and reduce expense in civil litigation).
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bious threshold arguments and invoked procedural technicalities to
stall civil actions or avoid reaching the merits.' 8 1 A notorious and
very controversial example was the Reagan administration's reliance
on the questionable idea of nonacquiescence. 182 Even after one, or
numerous, appeals courts had ruled against the United States on a
substantive legal issue, the Justice Department would persist in relitigating that question in other circuits.1 8 3 The Government only infrequently persuaded these courts, thus wasting valuable time and
resources of the parties, the Government, and the courts. 8 4
In numerous civil cases, the United States has found reasons not
to expedite the disposition of suits and has had substantial incentives to delay resolution. 8 5 justice delayed can be justice denied in
a very real sense, especially for resource-poor litigants such as injured individuals.18 6 The executive branch reform may positively affect some of the incentives that motivate government counsel and
could encourage them to reduce cost and delay.
Although the executive branch reform implements very few procedures that are not already available,' 8 7 the reform would affirmatively require all government lawyers to satisfy certain strictures
intended to decrease expense and delay. The procedures' nationwide scope means that they would apply to government attorneys in
each of the ninety-four districts,1 8 8 many of which include courts
181. See Tobias, LitigatingwithJustice, supra note 100, at 22 (noting delaying tactics of President Reagan's Civil Division, including invocation of dubious standing challenges and automatic, questionable motions to dismiss); see also Toothman, supra note 159, at 7 (maintaining
that government attorneys often delay pretrial process through excessive filing of motions
and answers).
182. Nonacquiescence refers to the refusal of federal agencies to conform their decisions
to adverse rulings of the courts of appeals. E.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE LJ. 679, 692-713 (1989) (examining

agencies' practice of selectively refusing to apply judicial precedent); see, e.g., Borton, Inc. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 734 F.2d 508, 510 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting
OSHRC's challenge to meaning of statutory language that was declared unambiguous in previous litigation); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (admonishing NLRB for intentional defiance of established judicial precedent); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966 (3d Cir. 1979) (reviewing NLRB order that
conceded applicability of established precedent but refused to follow it).
183. See Tobias, Litigating withJustice, supra note 100, at 22 (noting Government's practice
of relitigating legal issues in jurisdictions that had not resolved those issues).
184. See Tobias, Litigating withJustice, supra note 100, at 22 (noting that practice was espedally pernicious in litigation involving public entitlements, such as social security disability
payments).
185.

Tobias, Litigatingwith Justice, supra note 100, at 22.

186. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (recognizing disparity in litigation
resources between poor, uneducated plaintiffs and well-financed and fully staffed Government); cf. H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 RurGERs L. REv. 431, 431-34
(1986) (recognizing abuse of case expedition methods at expense of injured litigants).
187. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (observing similarities between executive
branch civil justice reform proposals and methods adopted by CJRA).
188. This would be important because numerous government lawyers have not always
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that may not incorporate all of these requirements in their civil justice plans.'8 9 Moreover, mandating that every government counsel
comply with the strictures imposes affirmative obligations on the
lawyers, rather than demanding that other attorneys, litigants, or
federal judges activate the procedures.190
Even though implementation of the executive branch reform will
be a significant administrative undertaking, 191 it is less substantial
than many similar duties routinely discharged by the Government.
An apt example is the annual need to communicate to all government lawyers applicable changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure. 19 2 Moreover, a small
expenditure of resources today that reduces expense and delay in
the long term may be a worthwhile investment.
Insofar as implementation of executive branch reform entails reconciliation of increasingly inconsistent federal civil procedures, the
Executive order contributes only minimally to conflicts and proyides
relevant guidance for resolving some anticipated difficulties. 19 3 Indeed, the fact that numerous executive branch procedures resemble
19 4
present procedural requirements actually affords certain benefits.
The procedural similarities reduce inconsistency and facilitate compliance because many lawyers, litigants, and judges are already familiar with existing strictures. Furthermore, primary responsibility
for treating these complications either belongs with other entities,
such as the individual districts,1 95 or has been assigned to additional
instrumentalities, such as Circuit Judicial Councils.' 96
litigated civil cases in ways that reduce expense and delay. See supra text accompanying notes
180-86 (discussing delaying practices employed by government attorneys).
189. Even the popular mandatory prediscovery disclosure procedure was adopted by only
a slight majority of the EIDCs. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting EIDCs that
employed mandatory prediscovery disclosure rules). See generally Tobias, Judicial Oversight,
supra note 24, at 51 (observing that district courts have employed different procedures governing mandatory discovery disclosure).
190. It is important to impose affirmative obligations, such as moving for settlement conferences, on government lawyers because of their past litigation practices. See supra text accompanying notes 180-86 (documenting methods used by government attorneys to delay civil
actions).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79 (discussing anticipated difficulties in administration of civil justice reform).
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988) (prescribing procedures governing rules' adoption).
193. See supra text accompanying note 176 (noting order's minimal contribution to existing prescriptions); see also Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019 (providing guidance for
resolving problems of overlapping procedures).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77 (observing similarity between existing procedures and executive branch guidelines).
195. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988) (ordering districts not to adopt local rules that conflict with Federal Rules or provisions of U.S. Code).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4) (1988) (providing that councils may modify or abrogate
inconsistent local rules).

1556

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1521

The Executive order would also increase consistency in the way
that the thousands of government lawyers handle civil litigation.
For instance, requiring senior government attorneys to review requests for document discovery and sanctioning activity in civil cases
involving the United States should help to regularize governmental
97
practices in these areas.'
It is important to remember that executive branch reform is a nascent effort to decrease expense and delay in civil suits and that reform efforts can be improved in accordance with the suggestions
offered in the third Part of this Article.' 9 8 For example, government

lawyers may interpret and implement the entire reform and specific
procedures in ways that enhance their ability to reduce expense or
delay.' 9 9 When certain measures prove to be less effective, the
problems that they pose could be amenable to amelioration. In
short, the Government might treat the reform's effectuation as an
ongoing experiment in which the general approach and particular
procedures can constantly be evaluated and calibrated as experience
accumulates.
The executive branch reform, therefore, may enable government
civil litigation to serve as a laboratory for experimentation with new
procedures or with mechanisms that are not being broadly used. 200
For instance, the implementation and employment of requirements
relating to settlement, ADR, and efficient case management might
illustrate ways of saving money or time that warrant widespread application, while ongoing experimentation may even lead to the invention of innovative techniques. 20 1 The reform could also realize
former President Bush's expressly declared goal of having the
197. Seesupra text accompanying notes 57-60, 63-65 (discussing §§ 1(d)(2)-(3) and l(1) of
order, which provide guidelines for discovery and sanctions).
198. See infra text accompanying notes 210-44 (urging Clinton administration to implement vigorously executive branch guidance and suggesting strategies for employing civil justice reform).
199. The lawyers could generously read and apply the procedures covering core disclosure. See infra text accompanying note 210 (suggesting that voluntary mutual exchange of
relevant information would expedite discovery). They might also pursue a cautious sanctions
policy. See Tobias, EnvironmentalLitigation, supra note 149, at 460 (relatingJustice Department
policy of pursuing sanctions only in cases of severe abuse of litigation process); infra text
accompanying note 211 (urging executive branch to pursue reasoned and moderate sanctions
policy).
200.

See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Divivion of Power, 139

U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1579-94 (1991) (suggesting that inconsistent local rules of civil procedure provide opportunity to test various methodologies in pursuit of most efficacious procedural framework); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field
Erpe'iments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67, 75-84 (suggesting adoption of

national and geographically restricted field experiments to evaluate effectiveness of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
201. When specific procedures prove particularly efficacious, they probably should be embodied in the Federal Rules and applied nationwide. See Tobias, Recalibrating the CJRA, supra
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United States set "an example for private litigation by adhering to
higher standards" than those required by current procedural
rules. 20 2 Former Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr characterized
the endeavor as an "effort to change the culture of federal litigation
at the behest of the federal government," 203 perhaps intimating that
modifications in attitudes might effect real change. 20 4 For example,
the reform may make government attorneys, many of whom understandably assumed their present posts because they wished to try
20 5
cases, more receptive to ADR.

Finally, it is especially important at this peculiar moment in the
history of the federal courts to initiate efforts that could reduce expense and delay in civil litigation. The federal judiciary is in serious
financial straits, attempting to operate effectively with a budget that
is $370 million less than was requested. 20 6 Additional support for
experimentation that might decrease cost and delay appears in the
purported reasons for the CJRA's passage, namely, the increasing
expense of resolving civil disputes, the shrinking access to federal
courts, and growing litigation abuse. 20 7
note 116, at 130 n.75 (suggesting systemwide application of civil justice reform procedures
that have proven most effective subsequent to EIDC experimentation).
202. Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 359-60 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991).
203. DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40.
204. See DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40 (reporting opinions, provided at annual meeting of ABA, on former President Bush's Executive order commanding government lawyers to
reduce civil litigation and delay). These public officials' views are considerably more sanguine
than those of numerous other observers who see the reform as a modest effort. Id.; see also
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 387-88 (noting that executive branch contributes few novel ideas to
civil justice reform movement); Cohn, supra note 123, at 100 (expressing doubt about efficacy
of procedures prescribed in CJRA).
205. This is premised on conversations withJustice Department personnel responsible for
coordinating executive branch reform and with other individuals familiar with civil justice
reform.
206. See DonJ. DeBenedictis, Tight Budget Squeezes Courts, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1992, at 22, 22-24
(reportingjudiciary budget cuts for fiscal year beginning October 1, 1992); Eva M. Rodriguez,
Federal Courts Face Year of Living Frugally, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at 1 (reporting that federal judiciary faces unprecedented systemwide budget cuts in 1993); see alsoJudiciary Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, 1856-59 (1993) (allocating salary, fee, and
expense funds to federal judiciary).
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. I 1990) (stating that purposes of statutorily required civil
justice expense and delay reduction plans are "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil
cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes"). I recognize that these ideas and, indeed, the CJRA's passage are controversial. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 2, at 379 (describing
CJRA as "a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal
judicial branch to the legislative branch"); Cohn, supra note 123, at 99-103 (criticizing CJRA);
see also Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisisin the FederalCourts, 7 OHIO ST.J. ON Dxsp. RESOL.
115, 115 (1991) (characterizing dispute over CJRA as intense and acrimonious).
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Transition by Way of Resolution

In sum, the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance
provide comparatively few procedures that judges or parties cannot
presently invoke, principally under the CJRA. A small number of
the requirements promise to reduce expense or delay significantly, 20 8 and some strictures apparently will be ineffective, costly,
or difficult to implement. 20 9 Nonetheless, the executive branch reform imposes on all government attorneys who litigate civil cases
certain requirements that could decrease expense or delay. Moreover, the serious fiscal and other restraints that the federal judiciary
increasingly confronts and the rising cost of civil litigation for many
parties and lawyers emphasize the need to institute efforts that
might reduce expense and delay. On balance, therefore, the general
approach embodied in the order and the guidelines and the specific
procedures included therein appear promising enough to warrant
vigorous implementation, continued experimentation, rigorous assessment, and exploration of how the reform might be improved
through refinement or elaboration.
III.

SUGGESTIONS

The Clinton administration should treat executive branch reform
as a nonpartisan effort that could benefit all parties and lawyers who
participate in federal litigation and the federal judiciary. It should
vigorously effectuate the Executive order and Justice Department
guidance that the Bush administration promulgated while rigorously analyzing the executive branch experimentation that occurs.
Vigorous implementation should proceed pursuant to certain
ideas included in the second Part of this Article. For instance, the
Government ought to interpret generously the requirements governing disclosure of core information and promote the voluntary
mutual exchange of the maximum relevant information as early in
the litigation as practicable. 21 0 The United States should also seek
208. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 141-43 (commenting that discovery provisions may save time and money); supra text accompanying notes 153-55 (suggesting that sanctions guidelines, if properly applied, could deter frivolous claims and make sanctions practices
more consistent and routine); supra text accompanying note 168 (noting that settlement procedures could reduce expense and delay by encouraging early resolution of lawsuits).
209. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 125-40 (suggesting that discovery disclosure
rules could increase expense of litigation); supra text accompanying notes 144-49 (noting that
sanctions provisions could increase cost and delay and promote incivility among litigators);
supra text accompanying notes 163-67 (commenting that rules urging settlement of disputes
might eliminate meritorious claims).
210. See supra text accompanying note 141 (suggesting that compliance with procedures
regarding disclosure of core information will expedite discovery).
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to foster widespread use of experimentation with settlement conferences and ADR while pursuing an appropriately balanced sanctions
policy. 2 1 Rigorous assessment would entail the establishment of
baselines to permit the accurate measurement of any expense and
delay reduction that the employment of certain procedures effects
and the careful collection, analysis, and synthesis of empirical data
212
showing such decreases.
Vigorous implementation and rigorous evaluation do not necessarily mean that all of the procedures must be fully effectuated in
every federal district and be subjected to searching scrutiny. Indeed, such an approach could be expensive and difficult to administer, inhibit careful experimentation and assessment, and even prove
counterproductive. The preferable course of action, therefore,
would be a narrower approach. The Clinton administration should
implement and evaluate a sufficient number of procedures in
enough districts with adequate rigor to afford representativeness,
some statistical validity, and a sense of efficacy. The administration
may want to designate certain districts in which it would vigorously
effectuate and rigorously analyze specific procedures. For instance,
the administration might emphasize the use of ADR in the three
courts that the CJRA designates as demonstration districts: the
Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia, and the Western District of Missouri.2 1 3 These courts are to
experiment with various expense and delay reduction techniques,
including ADR, and the Judicial Conference is to study this imple21 4
mentation and submit a report to Congress.
The Clinton administration should undertake a systematic effort
to identify the most efficacious procedures for decreasing cost and
delay. In addition to evaluating rigorously executive branch reform,
the administration should consult numerous other sources. The administration ought to monitor closely activity under the CJRA. It
should scrutinize the civil justice plans developed in the thirty-four
EIDCs for procedures that appear promising, such as the reliance of
several courts on the setting of early, firm trial dates2 1 5 and on co211. See supra notes 149, 152 and accompanying text (lauding government sanctions policy as reasonable and suggesting that proper implementation of Executive order requirements
would perpetuate appropriate utilization of sanctions); supra text accompanying note 168
(contending that increased government participation in settlement conferences and ADR will
promote expeditious resolution of civil suits).
212. See supra text accompanying note 116 (noting absence of measure for determining
efficacy of civil justice reform prescriptions).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. 11 1990).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., DIsTRcT OF IDAHO PLAN, supra note 37, at 3 (stating that firm trial dates are
necessary to promote economic efficiency, and requiring that cases be set for trial at "earliest
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equal assignment of civil cases to Article III judges and magistrate
judges. 21 6 The administration should also examine the annual assessments that the EIDCs have prepared or are compiling, such as
the evaluation of the ADR program instituted in the Western District of Missouri, 21 7 and the civil justice plans that the remaining dis-

tricts must adopt by December

1993.218

One important focus should be mechanisms that frontally attack
the costs of litigation. Most EIDCs have primarily attempted to reduce delay and thus indirectly limit expense. 21 9 The Eastern District of Texas is one court that implemented measures aimed
directly at cost, such as imposing ceilings on contingent fees and
220
establishing innovative requirements governing settlement offers.
The extent of discovery is another difficulty that needs special attention because it contributes significantly to unacceptable expense. A
number of EIDCs have imposed strict temporal or numerical limits

on discovery. 221 These restrictions may afford insufficient flexibility
practicable time"); DISTRICT OF MONTANA PLAN, supra note 139, at 14 (requiring establishment
of firm, certain trial dates and expedited trial docket); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF OR.,
CIVILJUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter DISTRICT OF
OREGON PLAN] (promoting establishment of firm trial dates).
216. See, e.g., DISTRIcT OF MONTANA PLAN, supra note 139, at 3-4 (providing guidelines for
assigning cases to judicial officers); DISTRICT OF OREGON PLAN, supra note 215, at 20 (providing that civil cases will be assigned to full-time magistrates and district judges on co-equal
basis); see also U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF ARK., CIVIL JUsTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN 3 (Dec. 30, 1991) (providing that civil cases will be randomly assigned to
district judges and magistrate judges on experimental basis); Tobias, Balkanization of Federal
Civil Procedure, supra note 140, at 1421-22 (reporting additional procedures developed by
EIDCs, including ongoingjudicial management programs and requirements that persons with
binding authority attend settlement conferences).
217. See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF Mo., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE EARLY AsSESSMENT PROGRAM 6-12 (Jan. 26, 1993) (describing ADR program's options and procedures
and requiring ongoing evaluation to determine success of program); see also supra notes 33,
215 and accompanying text (discussing annual assessments of demonstration districts established by CJRA); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF NJ., ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVILJUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 38-39 (Dec. 22, 1992) (modifying procedures to use judicial resources
more effectively).
218. See supra text accompanying note 16 (explaining CJRA requirement that federal trial
courts establish expense and delay reduction programs by December 1993); see also supra note
27 and accompanying text (predicting that some courts will employ expense and delay reduction plans prior to statutorily imposed deadline).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33 (discussing efforts of EIDCs to reduce delay
by encouraging settlement and ADR).
220. See EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAs PLAN, supra note 28, at 7-8, 10 (limiting contingent
fees in nonstatutory cases to 33.37o of total award or settlement and devising settlement procedure that requires parties who reject reasonable settlement offers to pay their opponents'
litigation costs in certain circumstances).
221. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSErS PLAN, supra note 29, at 35 (limiting discovery
practice of individual parties or groups of parties that share common intere.t to five depositions, 30 interrogatories, and two requests for production); EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEw YORK
PLAN, supra note 32, at 7 (suggesting presumptive discovery limitation of 15 interrogatories
and 10 depositions per side).
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in complex cases or in suits where plaintiffs need considerable dis22 2
covery to prove their cases.
The Clinton administration should not confine the search for
new, efficacious procedures to the CJRA and its implementation,
but should broadly explore numerous possibilities. For example,
the twenty districts that are currently experimenting with court-annexed arbitration pursuant to the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act
could yield helpful information. 2 23 The administration should also
examine and be receptive to the type of experimentation in specific
courts that anticipated the CJRA, 22 4 although much of the earlier
2 25
It
experimentation has probably been subsumed under the Act.

might similarly consider certain case management techniques that
the Eastern District of Virginia has successfully employed to maintain a current docket and early trial dates, even as the court effec226
tively eschewed reliance on the CJRA.

Valuable repositories of information on much of this efficacious
activity are the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and the Federal Judicial Center. All of the entities that Congress
charged with responsibility for oversight or study of the CJRA's implementation, such as circuit review committees, the Judicial Conference, and the RAND Corporation, 227 should also be helpful
222. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (noting that inherent characteristics
of civil rights cases often require extensive discovery). See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable
Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits ofJudicialPower,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683,
1809-11 (1992) (discussing court-imposed limitations on scope of discovery in cases entailing
complex litigation).
223. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing nationwide experimentation
with court-annexed arbitration).
224. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (noting judicial experimentation with
various case management techniques and ADR).
225. The experimentation probably is proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6)
(Supp. 11 1990). See Tobias, Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure,supra note 140, at 1420-22
(describing nonuniform experimental procedures implemented by various districts pursuant
to § 473(b)(6), which permits districts to adopt procedures not specifically authorized by
CJRA subsequent to advisory group recommendation).
226. See U.S. DIsT. COURT FOR THE E. DIsT. OF VA., CIVIL JUSTIcE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN 1-2, 9-13 (Dec. 16, 1991) (noting that court already employs, or is experimenting with, many of case management techniques recommended by CJRA, including early
involvement by judicial officer, mandatory pretrial conferences, and cooperative discovery;
and rejecting as unnecessary other recommendations, including requiring attendance of representatives with authority to bind party at initial pretrial conference, requiring parties to sign
requests for continuances, and standardization of pretrial orders). See generally Kim Dayton,
Case Management in the Eastern Districtof Virginia, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 445, 449-87 (1992) (describing effective and efficient case management practices of Eastern District of Virginia).
227. See Tobias, Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure,supra note 140, at 1406-11 (explaining role of circuit review committees and Judicial Conference concerning CJRA implementation and suggesting that oversight responsibilities assigned by Congress are unclear and
foster complex and disuniform rules in various districts). The RAND Corporation is preparing the "program study report" on the pilot program. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II
1990) (requiring that "independent organization with expertise in the area of Federal court
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sources of material. The Clinton administration may want to set
early 1994 as a target date by which to decide whether and, if so,
how to modify the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance. The administration should be able to make well-informed
determinations by that time. 228
The Clinton administration, when treating the Executive order
and Department ofJustice guidelines, should delete any procedures
that have proved unworkable, confusing, or ineffective in reducing
expense and delay. The administration should also eliminate procedures whose disadvantages outweigh their benefits, especially those
that impose detrimental side effects or threaten important process
values. The administration could draw, for instance, on experimentation with executive branch reforms in the EIDCs, which might be
documented in their annual assessments. Those requirements in
the Executive order and the accompanying guidance covering notice
before filing, discovery disputes, use of expert witnesses, and governmental participation in ADR may operate inefficiently, impose
unnecessary costs or delays, or even strategically prejudice the
2 29
United States.
In contrast, the Clinton administration should add to the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance any techniques that
clearly have decreased or promise to reduce expense or delay. The
administration could rely, for example, on experience in the EIDCs,
executive branch experimentation, or innovative measures included
in the civil justice plans that the non-EIDCs develop or that the admanagement" conduct study of pilot program for report submitted by Judicial Conference to
Congress).
228. There will beat least a year's worth of experience with executive branch reform that
the administration can use to assess and modify civil justice reform procedures. By 1994,
nearly all of the EIDCs will have completed one annual assessment, and some will have compiled a second. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (describing annual assessments
prepared by various EIDCs). Courts that are not EIDCs will have adopted civil justice plans
by December 1993, as required by theJudicial Improvements Act of 1990. See supra text accompanying note 218 (urging administration to examine non-EIDC civil justice plans). Federal Rules amendments, especially those governing sanctions and discovery, will also have
become effective. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34 (discussing Federal Rules amendments that become effective in December 1993).
229. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (recognizing that requiring counsel to
engage in additional activity to resolve discovery disputes will increase litigation costs); supra
text accompanying notes 156-59 (arguing that limiting use of expert witnesses could impede
government litigation in areas of science, technology, public health, and environment); supra
text accompanying note 162 (suggesting that notice requirements could induce defendants to
flee or destroy evidence); supra text accompanying notes 163-67 (noting that ADR can deplete
parties' resources and disadvantage resource-poor litigants). See generally Tobias, Balkanization
of Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 140, at 1426 (suggesting that by expanding litigation responsibilities and making it more difficult to reach merits of disputes, certain aspects of civil
justice reform such as ADR and managerial judging could lead to greater expense and delay
in civil litigation).
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ministration discovers in broadly exploring novel procedures. Certain mechanisms that some districts have employed to expedite the
resolution of specific types of government litigation, such as social
security appeals and student loan cases, may prove efficacious and
23 0
could warrant national application.
The Clinton administration should designate those procedures in
the Executive order and Department of Justice guidelines that are
not clearly efficacious or are ineffective in reducing expense and delay. For instance, it may be too early to ascertain definitively
whether governmental participation in particular forms of ADR,
23 1
such as mediation or summary jury trials, decreases cost or delay.
The administration should leave in effect those provisions the efficacy of which remains uncertain, ought to continue vigorously experimenting with the procedures, and should rigorously evaluate
them.
The Clinton administration will also need to conform the requirements in the order and the guidance to applicable Federal Rules
amendments, which will become effective in December 1993. The
revisions governing mandatory prediscovery disclosure, principally
under rule 26, and sanctions pursuant to rule 11 now appear most
relevant 23 2 because Congress probably will resist the considerable
pressure that may be exerted 23 3 to modify proposals that would
23 4
amend rules recently submitted to it by the Supreme Court.
If the requirements covering compulsory prediscovery disclosure
take effect as currently drafted, they could preempt the order's pro230. See, e.g., DisTRICT OF MONTANA PLAN, supra note 139, at 34 (mandating expedited
procedures for certain cases, including federal debt-collection and forfeiture actions); DisTRicr OF OREGON PLAN, supra note 215, at 11 (providing special scheduling procedures for
Social Security cases).
231. See supra notes 52, 98 and accompanying text (discussing ADR and its use by government attorneys); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. II 1990) (providing CJRA's ADR
prescription).
232. See supra notes 37, 136 and accompanying text (discussing prediscovery disclosure);
infra text accompanying notes 236-38 (addressing issue of sanctions according to Executive
order, rule 11, and Justice Department policies).
233. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting opposition to section of 1991 draft
of Federal Rules concerning prediscovery disclosure); see also George Cochran, Bench-BarAlternativefor Rule 11, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15-16 (discussing controversy over proposed
rule 11 amendment scheduled to take effect in December 1993); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights
Plaintiffs and the ProposedRevision of Rule 11, 77 IowA L. REv. 1775 (1992), [hereinafter Tobias,
Proposed Revision] (finding present rule 11 draft solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs who are disadvantaged and detrimentally affected by 1983 revision of rule).
234. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993); see also Letter from L. Ralph Mecham,
Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to the Chief Justice of the United States
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 1 (Nov. 27, 1992) (on file with The American
University Law Review) (reproducingJudicial Conference transmittal to Supreme Court of proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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visions governing disclosure of core information. 23 5 Were the revised rule 11 to become effective as presently written, the order's
requirements respecting sanctions might not violate the letter, but
could well contravene the spirit, of the amended rule. 23 6 For instance, the rule revisors modified rule 11 in several important ways
that evince clear intent to reduce the rule's invocation significantly. 23 7 The administration could more closely align the order
with this fundamental purpose by reinstituting the Justice Department's properly tempered policy of seeking sanctions only for severe litigation abuse or by at least deemphasizing the requirement
that government counsel scrutinize all of their opponents' filings for
23 8
evidence of sanctionable activity.
One of the Clinton administration's most difficult tasks will be refining the retained executive branch requirements in ways that will
facilitate governmental efforts to decrease expense and delay. Express and implicit suggestions for improvement appear throughout
the above criticisms of the Executive order and the attendant guidance. For instance, if the Federal Rules amendment covering
mandatory prediscovery disclosure does not preempt the order's
strictures on disclosure of core information, 23 9 the administration
should require that more information be divulged earlier in the litigation process. Other procedures that should be retained are the
order's prescriptions for governmental participation in settlement
235. The Rules Enabling Act, arguably, would accord Federal Rules precedence over procedures prescribed in an Executive order, especially when the Federal Rules are more stringent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) (mandating that rules of evidence, practice, and
procedure prescribed by Supreme Court take precedence over any conflicting rules); supra
note 195 and accompanying text (noting that local rules adopted by district courts must be
consistent with Federal Rules or U.S. Code provisions); supra text accompanying notes 129-31
(indicating that Federal Rules are more rigorous than executive branch reforms).
236. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4369-70 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (proposing to Congress amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 43-58 (Sept. 1992) (providing proposed revisions to rule 11 sanctioning procedures); see also supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text (explaining order's sanctioning provisions). See generally Tobias, Proposed
Revision, supra note 233 (discussing proposed amendments to rule 11, which are designed to
lessen sanctioning activity).
237. See Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, supra note 172, at 875-77, 880-93 (discussing provisions for "safe harbors," which provide litigants opportunity to correct improper behavior
before sanctions are issued, and reduced fee shifting, which limits effect of sanctions imposed
under rule 11); see also Tobias, ProposedRevision, supra note 233 (examining proposed amendments that are intended to reduce rule 11 activity by making pursuit of sanctions more burdensome). Indeed, the drafters' intent to reduce the rule's invocation apparently provoked
Justice Scalia's dissent. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4369-70 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (suggesting that
rule 11 be amended).
238. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § I(0, 3 C.F.R. 359, 362 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (providing executive branch position on sanctions).
239. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (noting probable preemption by Federal
Rules of Executive order).
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conferences and ADR. 240 It may be possible to calibrate the retained litigation requirements by delineating specific techniques
that apply with greater or less efficacy in various contexts. For instance, considerable evidence suggests that some environmental
disputes are comparatively amenable to resolution through the use
24
of certain ADR mechanisms. '
The Clinton administration should undertake a concerted effort
to make executive branch reform function smoothly. The administration ought to clarify any aspects of the Executive order and Justice Department guidelines that remain ambiguous. 2 42 It should do
everything feasible to maximize consistency among the plethora of
procedures that apply to federal civil litigation. One approach mentioned previously is to reconcile the executive branch procedures
with the forthcoming Federal Rules amendments. 2 43 The administration should similarly attempt to integrate the order's provisions
with measures prescribed pursuant to the CJRA in the ninety-four
judicial districts. Although complete uniformity is obviously unattainable, considerable consistency can be secured, for instance, by
making the order's procedures closely resemble those applicable in
244
the largest number of districts.
Once the Clinton administration has instituted the above suggestions, it should revise the Executive order and Justice Department
guidance, as warranted, and promulgate modified requirements.
The administration should guarantee that executive branch reform
is vigorously implemented and rigorously evaluated. It should reexamine the effort periodically, perhaps yearly, focusing its examination on those features that are controversial or the efficacy of which
is unclear. The administration should correspondingly attempt to
minimize inconsistency among applicable procedures and to maximize coordination of executive branch reform. When these reviews
240. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, §§ 1(b)-(c), 3 C.F.R. at 360-61, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (containing provisions regarding settlement and ADR).
241.

See, e.g., GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPUTEs: A DECADE OF EXPERI-

140-47 (1986) (evaluating success of environmental dispute resolution alternatives); see
also Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 133, 133-65 (1985) (examining negotiated rulemaking procedures in EPA
cases as alternative to traditional notice and comment process).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49, 160-67, 176-77 (commenting on deficiencies of Executive order in areas of sanctions, settlement, and ADR).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 232-38 (addressing need for Clinton administration to reconcile Executive order with Federal Rules amendments that become effective in
December 1993).
244. This may vary depending on the specific procedures at issue. For instance, if the
Federal Rules proposals become effective, prediscovery disclosure and rule 11 sanctioning
should be uniform. See supra text accompanying note 238 (suggesting method to harmonize
dissimilar reform provisions). Considerable discrepancy probably will remain among judicial
districts in the areas of settlement and expert testimony.
ENCE
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indicate ways of improving the reforms, the order and the guidelines should be modified accordingly.
CONCLUSION

The civil justice reform effort that the Bush administration initiated in the executive branch remains nascent. The endeavor could
reduce expense and delay in the federal civil litigation to which the
United States is a party, might provide instructive experimentation
with efficacious procedures, and may permit the Government to
serve as a model for private litigants. That potential could be realized if the Clinton administration follows the above recommendations. The administration should vigorously implement the
Executive order and the Justice Department guidance, rigorously
evaluate the resultant experimentation, and broadly explore additional mechanisms that will decrease cost and delay. Once the administration has collected, analyzed, and synthesized the relevant
information, it should refine the executive branch procedures as indicated and continue experimentation that will reduce expense and
delay in civil cases.

